TRUST IN DATA AND STATISTICS
THE CASE OF ARGENTINA

UNWDF webinar series on trust in statistics
25 April, 2019

HERNÁN MUÑOZ
National Director of Planning, Institutional and International Relations
“The data are wrong (even deliberately wrong) or inaccurate

“The IMF’s Executive Board... has issued a declaration of censure against Argentina in connection with its breach of obligation to the Fund under the Articles of Agreement.

“The Board called on Argentina to adopt the remedial measures to address the inaccuracy of CPI-GBA and GDP data without further delay...[to] ensure accurate measurement.”


INDEC: BACKGROUND AND CURRENT SITUATION

MAIN CHALLENGES AT THE BEGINNING OF THE ADMINISTRATION (Dec 2015)
1  | Reliability of indicators
2  | Loss of leadership over NSS
3  | Institutional weakness

REBUILDING PROCESS. SUCCESS FACTORS:
1  | Role of policy-makers and individuals actors (advocates)
2  | International reinsertion
3  | Argentina’s New Administration based on:
   I  | Transparency
   II | Evidence based public policy
4  | Role of the crisis / Public awareness and support

20 JUNE 2014.

The Economist
Official statistics
Don’t lie to me, Argentina
Why we are removing a figure from our indicators page

27 MAY 2017.

The Economist
Welcome back:
Argentina’s new, honest inflation statistics
The end of bogus accounting
## UNDERMINING TRUST

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mode of undermining</th>
<th>Examples of the political intervention at INDEC (2007-2015)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Mission of the statistical service</td>
<td>Concept of “militant statistics”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Financial resources and controls</td>
<td>Lack of funding for statistics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Staff</td>
<td>Replacement of staff with political supporters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Supression or changes in series</td>
<td>Supression of poverty and indigence statistics (2013). Alteration of the CPI. Unexpected change of GDP base (March 2014)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Definitions, concepts and methodology</td>
<td>Ad hoc methodological changes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Terms and nomenclature</td>
<td>CPI. Labour market. Foreign trade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Altering specific numbers</td>
<td>Alteration of statistical series (CPI, poverty, GDP...)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Extent and timing of release data</td>
<td>Unclear dissemination schedule. Bases not published</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Threats to confidentiality</td>
<td>Political pressure to reveal informants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Use of NSO for politics</td>
<td>Defence and promotion of militant statistics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 Campaigns to discredit</td>
<td>Persecution of former officials and analysts</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

W. Seltzer (UN, 1994) defined eleven models of institutionally undermining an NSO. The political intervention in Argentina included all of them.
REBUILDING TRUST

PATH BASED ON FIVE STRATEGIC PILLARS:

- International reinsertion
- Strengthening of statistical capacity
- Leadership of the NSS
- Improvement of dissemination policies
- Institutional transformation
THANK YOU!