MEASUREMENT OF TECHNOLOGY-FACILITATED GBV AND METHODOLOGIES: ISSUES FOR CONSIDERATION

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Why do we need data on TFGBV?

There is clear international evidence that TF GBV is both common and harmful. However, further evidence is required to:

- Understand **trends** in this emerging form of gender-based violence.
- Understand the **effectiveness** of programming and systems of accountability.
- Use in **advocacy** in support of survivors, victims and targets of TF GBV through laws, policies, programmes and investment.
**Prevalence data**

- When combined with other GBV data, it may provide an accurate picture of the extent of the issue
- Gives governments and estimate of the scale and impact of the problem
- Can quantify relationships with other forms of violence
- Able to track change over time
- May be able to support national comparative analysis

- No internationally agreed questions or indicators that capture majority of forms of TF GBV
- Same questions to track change means new forms remain undetected [this could underestimate prevalence]
- Difficult to measure frequency or number of incidents, as these may not be distinct
- VAW surveys include women aged 15+, challenges to capture early adolescents and persons who do not identify as women
- Nature and impact of TF GBV is different across contexts – difficult to make cross-country comparisons

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Technology facilitated gender-based violence</th>
<th>Physical</th>
<th>Psychological</th>
<th>Economic</th>
<th>Sexual</th>
<th>Social, political, other</th>
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| **IPV**
Use of ‘smart devices’ to cause a current or former partner physical harm (e.g., using apps to interfere with cars or household appliances) | Use of mobile technology to check a partner’s location in a way that feels controlling | Obsessive and persistent texting or messaging | Hacking a current or former partner’s phone or computer to obtain intimate images or other private information that may be used to blackmail them into unwanted sexual activity, or to extort money from them | Hacking a current or former partner’s social media accounts (for example) to alter information and cause them social or political harm |
| Use of tracking devices to stalk and locate a current or former partner to enact physical violence | Use of online banking systems to send threatening messages (e.g., through the ‘notes’ attached to payments) or to make nuisance payments (e.g., child support payments made in a large number of transfers of a very small amount) | Non-consensual distribution of sexual images | Denying, limiting and/or monitoring a partner’s access to and use of all forms of technology |
| Distribution of images or information leading to ‘honour’-based violence | Forcing a current or former partner to perform sexual acts on camera in exchange for financial payments (e.g., remittances, child support payments) | Sextortion (coercing or blackmailing a person into sexual activity by threatening to distribute private images or information) | Upskirting |
| **Non-partner sexual violence**
Use of technology to recruit women and girls into trafficking, early marriage and sexual servitude | Threats of sexual violence intended to cause fear | Using dating apps or other digital tools to obtain access to a person with the intent of committing sexual assault | Defamation on the basis of sexuality and sexual behaviour |
| Sending unsolicited sexual images or content | Sextortion (coercing or blackmailing a person into sexual activity by threatening to distribute private images or information) | Sextortion (coercing or blackmailing a person into sexual activity by threatening to distribute private images or information) | Upskirting |
| **Other forms of GBV**
Cyberstalking or use of technology to track the physical location of a person in order to commit an assault | Mobbing or other forms of online gender-based harassment | Deceiving people into transferring money through online romance scams and fake marriage agencies | Deep fake sexual images or videos | Doxing (disclosing personal information in order to undermine a person’s anonymity, privacy, safety, credibility and/or reputation) |
| Publicising a person’s home address with the intent that others may cause them harm | Online threats and intimidation against women in the public sphere | Hacking the bank accounts or other resources of women’s rights organisations | Online grooming of a child or adolescent with the intent of committing sexual assault | Impersonating a person to damage their reputation or credibility |
| Hate speech inciting physical violence or undermining participation in the public sphere (especially dangerous when combined with doxing and stalking) | | | | Targeted surveillance of women’s sexual and reproductive health organisations and services, including those procured online (which may include abortion, contraception) |

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a. Related to SDG indicator 5.2.1, limited aspects of which are currently measured and reported through national prevalence surveys.
b. Related to SDG indicator 5.2.2, limited aspects of which are currently measured and reported through national prevalence surveys.
c. Related to SDG 5 but not currently measured.
Conclusions

(1) Increase understanding of forms, impacts and dynamics of TF GBV at national level before developing questions for prevalence surveys.

(2) Support generation of in-depth qualitative evidence, robust quantitative data about specific forms of TF GBV and service data, and analysis of policy and legislation.

(3) Generate evidence through participatory, trauma-informed, and healing-informed approaches.

(4) Do no harm - Robust and ethical approaches to the use of technology to data collection, analysis and storage.

(5) Effective regulatory systems and prevention and response initiatives are needed now.