The Sustainable Development Goals Extended Report 2026

Inputs and information provided as of 30 April 2026

10 REDUCED INEQUALITIES



Note: This unedited 'Extended Report' includes all indicator storyline contents as provided by the SDG indicator custodian agencies as of 30 April 2026. For instances where the custodian agency has not submitted a storyline for an indicator, please see the custodian agency focal point information for further information. The 'Extended Report' aims to provide the public with additional information regarding the SDG indicators and is compiled by the Statistics Division (UNSD) of the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs. Storylines presented in this document may slightly differ from figures cited in the SDG Report 2026 text due to the timing of the submission and the subsequent updates received upon finalizing the Report.

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Target 10.1 By 2030, progressively achieve and sustain income growth of the bottom 40 per cent of the population at a rate higher than the national average

Indicator 10.1.1 Growth rates of household expenditure or income per capita among the bottom 40 per cent of the population and the total population

Nearly 60 percent of countries have achieved pro-poor growth since 2015

In a sample of 112 countries with at least two surveys conducted since 2015, nearly 60 percent experienced a positive income or consumption growth of the bottom 40 percent that is greater than the national average. This indicator is a measure of inclusive, pro-poor growth (or, put differently, shared prosperity). Uneven patterns of progress on this indicator are observed by region and income group.

Shared prosperity is not evenly spread across the regions of the world. Relatively high numbers of countries in East and South-East Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, and North America and Europe have experienced shared prosperity, while relatively few countries in the Middle East and North Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Central and South Asia have recorded such a progress. Asia has seen significant growth episodes, however, there is a sharp contrast when comparing East and South-East Asia where 73 percent of countries have achieved shared prosperity and Central and South Asia where only 38 percent of countries have seen such a progress. Regions with high levels of extreme poverty, including Sub-Saharan Africa and to a much lesser extent the Middle East and North Africa, also have relatively few countries managing to achieve pro-poor growth.

Differences in achievement also exist across income levels. Upper-middle- and high-income countries have achieved more pro-poor growth than lower-middle- and low-income countries. Low-income countries do not only have a challenge with low economic growth, but growth is not inclusive enough to deliver maximum benefits to the poor. For this reason, the prospect of poverty reduction in low-income countries is low, when looking ahead into 2030.

Share of countries with growth of bottom 40 higher than national average (%)



Storyline author(s)/contributor(s): Samuel Kofi Tetteh-Baah, World Bank; Jing Xie, World Bank; Christoph Lakner, World Bank; Umar Serajuddin, World Bank

Custodian agency(ies): World Bank

Target 10.2 By 2030, empower and promote the social, economic and political inclusion of all, irrespective of age, sex, disability, race, ethnicity, origin, religion or economic or other status

Indicator 10.2.1 Proportion of people living below 50 per cent of median income, by sex, age and persons with disabilities

6 in 10 countries have seen progress in reducing the share of population living on less than half the median since 2015

From a sample of 109 countries, 6 in 10 countries have seen progress in reducing the share of the population living on less than half the median since 2015. This indicator is a measure of within-country inequality. It measures the share of the population who are unable to afford the lifestyle that is expected of them in their countries. It measures relative deprivation and is closely related to inequality.

Wide regional differences exist. Only four out of 10 countries in Central and South Asia have seen progress since 2015, whereas all 2 countries in Oceania (excluding Australia and New Zealand) have seen progress. About 60 percent of countries in the Middle East and North Africa, North America and Europe, and Sub-Saharan Africa have seen progress, while about 70 percent of countries in Latin America and the Caribbean and East and South-East Asia have seen progress.

Percent of countries that have reduced share of population living below 50 percent of the median



To unpack the overall progress seen in reducing relative poverty and inequality within countries, additional analysis is conducted using a subsample of 93 countries with surveys before and after the COVID-19 pandemic. For each country, the earliest survey since 2015 has been selected and the most recent survey after 2020 has also been selected. Across all 93 countries, the share of the population living on less than half the median reduced by 1.4 percentage points to 13 percent. East and South-East Asia, Oceania (excluding Australia and New Zealand), and Sub-Saharan Africa have reduced the share of population living on less than half the median by more than 2 percent points. By contrast, Central and South Asia and the Middle East and North Africa have increased the share of their population living on less than half the median by about 2 and 0.3 percentage points, respectively.

Regional disparities also exist in terms of post-COVID-19 levels. At one end of the spectrum, Latin American and the Caribbean records as high as 20 percent of the population living on less than half the median. At the other end, Central and South Asia and Oceania (excluding Australia and New Zealand) have about 9 and 5 percent of the population living on less than half the median.

As these results are based on a limited sample of countries with data, the results should be interpreted with caution.

Percent of population living on less than half the median - before and after COVID-19



Storyline author(s)/contributor(s): Samuel Kofi Tetteh-Baah, World Bank; Jing Xie, World Bank; Christoph Lakner, World Bank; Umar Serajuddin, World Bank

Custodian agency(ies): World Bank

Target 10.3 Ensure equal opportunity and reduce inequalities of outcome, including by eliminating discriminatory laws, policies and practices and promoting appropriate legislation, policies and action in this regard

Indicator 10.3.1/16.b.1 Proportion of population reporting having personally felt discriminated against or harassed in the previous 12 months on the basis of a ground of discrimination prohibited under international human rights law

More data, same reality: discrimination remains widespread, structured, and under-measured

Nearly one in five people globally report having experienced discrimination in the past 12 months. New evidence shows that this pattern persists despite expanded data coverage. Overall, race, colour, ethnicity, and socio-economic status are the most commonly reported reasons for discrimination.

Across regions, certain groups face systematically higher levels of discrimination. Persons with disabilities report among the highest levels of discrimination, with nearly one in three affected. Disaparities persist across income and education levels, with poorer and less educated populations consistently reporting higher rates than their more advantaged counterparts. Respondents in least developed countries report slightly higher rates on average.

Differences are also observed across gender. Women report higher levels of gender-based discrimination.

For the first time, data disaggregated by sexual orientation and gender identity introduce a critical and still under-measured dimension. Although available for a very limited number of countries, the evidence reveals some of the highest levels of sexual orientation and gender identity discrimination recorded. Individuals identifying as sexual minorities report discrimination rates that are two to three times higher than those of the population as a whole.

Data on gender identity show even sharper disparities, with transgender and other gender-diverse individuals frequently reporting the highest levels observed, often exceeding 60 per cent.

Important data gaps remain. Fewer than half of countries provide data disaggregated by income, education, or migration status, and only a few report data disaggregated by sexual orientation and/or gender identity. The highest disparities are often found where data are most limited. In addition, relatively few countries regularly conduct repeated surveys, constraining the ability to assess trends over time.

Closing these gaps is essential to fully understand the scale and nature of discrimination and to design effective, targeted responses. Without better data, discrimination remains only partially visible. Without visibility, it cannot be effectively addressed — and the commitment to leave no one behind will remain out of reach.

On average, sexual and gender minorities report up to 2.6 times higher discrimination rates



Storyline author(s)/contributor(s): Predrag Savic, OHCHR

Custodian agency(ies): OHCHR

Target 10.4 Adopt policies, especially fiscal, wage and social protection policies, and progressively achieve greater equality

Indicator 10.4.1 Labour share of GDP

Workers' share of economic output has declined modestly over the last 10 years, exacerbating income inequality

Labour income data are essential for understanding inequality. In 2025, 57.9 per cent of working-age persons were employed worldwide, meaning that labour income directly affects the livelihoods of 3.6 billion workers and their families. A declining labour income share of GDP indicates that gains in labour productivity are not fully translating into gains in labour compensation. This implies relatively higher returns to capital, which can increase inequality, as capital income is typically more concentrated among the affluent. The global labour income share declined from 53.0 per cent in 2015 to 52.6 per cent in 2025, contributing to upward pressure on inequality. This decline represents an average of US$196 (PPP) per worker per year.

Most regions experienced declines in the labour income share between 2015 and 2025. The drop was particularly pronounced in Small Island Developing States (SIDS) and Landlocked developing countries (LLDCs), where the share dropped by 1.9 and 1.5 percentage points, respectively. In contrast, Central Asia and Southern Asia recorded an increase, while Least Developed Countries (LDCs) saw a modest rise, though its share remained below the global average.

The sharpest global decline occurred in 2023, reflecting the peak of post-pandemic inflationary pressures. More recent data for 2025 point to a gradual recovery, as real wages begin to catch up with earlier inflation in several regions, including most notably in Northern America and Europe.

Labour income share (%), 2015 to 2025



Storyline author(s)/contributor(s): ILO

Custodian agency(ies): ILO

Indicator 10.4.2 Redistributive impact of fiscal policy on the Gini index

Custodian agency(ies): World Bank

Target 10.5 Improve the regulation and monitoring of global financial markets and institutions and strengthen the implementation of such regulations

Indicator 10.5.1 Financial Soundness Indicators

Custodian agency(ies): IMF

Target 10.6 Ensure enhanced representation and voice for developing countries in decision-making in global international economic and financial institutions in order to deliver more effective, credible, accountable and legitimate institutions

Indicator 10.6.1/16.8.1 Proportion of members and voting rights of developing countries in international organizations

Custodian agency(ies): DESA/FFDO

Target 10.7 Facilitate orderly, safe, regular and responsible migration and mobility of people, including through the implementation of planned and well-managed migration policies

Indicator 10.7.1 Recruitment cost borne by employee as a proportion of monthly income earned in country of destination

Custodian agency(ies): ILO, World Bank

Indicator 10.7.2 Proportion of countries with migration policies that facilitate orderly, safe, regular and responsible migration and mobility of people

Custodian agency(ies): DESA Population Division, IOM

Indicator 10.7.3 Number of people who died or disappeared in the process of migration towards an international destination

7,900 Lives Lost Along Migration Routes: What the Data Reveal in 2025

In 2025, at least **7,900 people died or disappeared while migrating**, a stark reminder that stronger protection and policy measures are needed to prevent these tragedies. While this figure marks a decline from 2024—the deadliest year on record—it should not be read as a sign of meaningful progress. Instead, the data reflect a complex mix of changing migration patterns, reduced movement along some routes, and growing blind spots in how deaths are recorded.

In parts of the Americas, recorded deaths fell to historic lows, with just **412 deaths documented**. Fewer people appear to have attempted some of the most dangerous routes, including crossings through the Darién National Park and along the U.S.–Mexico border. However, delays in official reporting and gaps in access to information mean that some deaths from 2025 may never be counted, leaving families without answers and the true scale of loss uncertain.

Across maritime routes to Europe,**3,404 people were confirmed dead or missing** in the Mediterranean and on the Atlantic route toward the Canary Islands. These figures are lower than in the previous year, but they tell only part of the story. Reports suggest that **at least 1,500 additional people may have been lost at sea**, with too little information available to verify and document their deaths. Additionally, more than **200 human remains washed ashore** without links to known shipwrecks, underscoring how many journeys end invisibly.

Asia stands out as the deadliest region in 2025, with **over 3,300 migrant deaths recorded**, marking the third consecutive year of record-breaking loss. Many of those who died were fleeing conflict, persecution, or entrenched insecurity. Afghans accounted for more than half of the documented deaths in the region, **with 1,540 reported dead**, often perishing while escaping a country where survival itself has become uncertain. Another **705 Rohingya people lost their lives** at sea, attempting crossings that offered hope but carried overwhelming risk.

Along the Eastern Route from the Horn of Africa toward Yemen and Gulf countries, deaths rose sharply. At least **922 people died**, most of them Ethiopian migrants, many of whom died in three mass shipwrecks that claimed hundreds of lives at once. These incidents highlight how danger intensifies when people are pushed toward ever more precarious journeys.

Behind every number is a person whose absence reshapes families and communities. Yet the data also show what is missing: incomplete records, underreported routes, and unanswered questions. Strengthening data collection, access, and humanitarian presence is not only about counting the dead—it is about preventing future loss of life, informing safer migration pathways, and ensuring that their families are not left behind.

Migrant fatalities in 2025 by region



Additional resources, press releases, data blog/stories, etc. with links:

- https://missingmigrants.iom.int/data

Storyline author(s)/contributor(s): Andrea García Borja, International Organization for Migration

Custodian agency(ies): IOM

Indicator 10.7.4 Proportion of the population who are refugees, by country of origin

First small decrease in over a decade in the global refugee population – action needed to turn into meaningful progres

SDG Indicator 10.7.4 tracks the proportion of a country's population who become refugees or other people in need of international protection. Globally, 444 people out of every 100,000 were refugees at mid-2025. Five years earlier, this figure stood at 310 per 100,000, and in 2015 it was less than half of today's level - 214 per 100,000.

The three countries with the highest proportions of their national populations who have become refugees or other people in need of international protection were Venezuela (18,469 per 100,000), Syria (17,632 per 100,000), and South Sudan (16,352 per 100,000). Many of the largest refugee-origin countries a decade ago remain so today, underscoring the increasingly protracted nature of forced displacement.

In absolute numbers, by the end of June 2025 the population of refugees under UNHCR's mandate—including people in refugee-like situations and others in need of international protection—reached 36.6 million. In addition, 5.9 million refugees were under the mandate of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA). Palestine refugees under UNRWA's mandate are not included in SDG Indicator 10.7.4.

After more than a decade of global increases, the number of refugees declined slightly during the first half of 2025—a trend that preliminary end-2025 data confirms has continued. This decrease reflects a sharp rise in refugee returns in some of the world's largest displacement situations. However, many of these returns have taken place under adverse conditions, often to areas where insecurity persists and access to basic services is limited or absent, raising concerns about the sustainability of these movements.

For the global number of refugees to decline meaningfully, progress is required in addressing the root causes of forced displacement: conflict, disregard for the basic tenets of international humanitarian law, and other forms of violence and persecution. In the meantime, resources to meet urgent humanitarian needs, support host countries, prevent dangerous onward movements, and help refugees find durable solutions to their displacement remain more essential than ever.

Proportion of a country's population who become refugees, per 100,000 | 2015, 2020, mid-2025



Additional resources, press releases, data blog/stories, etc. with links:

- Mid-YearTrends | UNHCR
- Refugee Data Finder- Key Indicators

Storyline author(s)/contributor(s): Janis Kreuder; UNHCR

Custodian agency(ies): UNHCR

Target 10.a Implement the principle of special and differential treatment for developing countries, in particular least developed countries, in accordance with World Trade Organization agreements

Indicator 10.a.1 Proportion of tariff lines applied to imports from least developed countries and developing countries with zero-tariff

Custodian agency(ies): ITC, UNCTAD, WTO

Target 10.b Encourage official development assistance and financial flows, including foreign direct investment, to States where the need is greatest, in particular least developed countries, African countries, small island developing States and landlocked developing countries, in accordance with their national plans and programmes

Indicator 10.b.1 Total resource flows for development (e.g. official development assistance, foreign direct investment and other flows)

Total receipts by developing countries from DAC donors, multilateral agencies and other providers amounted in 2024 USD 508 billion, an increase of 61% compared to previous year

In 2024, total receipts by developing countries from DAC donors, multilateral agencies and other providers were USD 508 billion, of which USD 256 billion were in the form of Official Development Assistance (ODA), USD 81 billion in the form of Other Official Flows (OOF) and USD 7 billion in the form of Private Sector Instruments (PSI). Private flows which tend to be more volatile than ODA, have increased since 2023 from USD 117 billion USD 165 billion in 2024.

Since 2015, total resource flows have increased in volume by 61%. The proportion of Official Development Assistance decreased from 54% in 2015 to 50% in 2024 although it experienced a lot of variations during the period mainly due to the volatility of private flows.

Asia was the region that received the largest volume of flows (USD 133 billion or 26% of the total) followed by the Africa (USD 78 billion or 15% of the total) , Latin America and the Caribbean (USD 76.5 billion or 15%), Europe (USD 70.5 billion or 14%) and Oceania (USD 4.1 billion or 0.8%). Almost 29% of the total ressources flows were not allocated to a specific country. Least Developed Countries received USD 80 billion.

From the bilateral donor perspective, in 2024, the United States, Germany and the EU institutions were the countries at the origin of larger flows towards developing countries amounting USD 321.6 billion, USD 66.2 billion and USD 36.1 billion respectively.

Total resource flows for development



Custodian agency(ies): OECD

Target 10.c By 2030, reduce to less than 3 per cent the transaction costs of migrant remittances and eliminate remittance corridors with costs higher than 5 per cent

Indicator 10.c.1 Remittance costs as a proportion of the amount remitted

Overall remittance costs remained high in the fourth quarter of 2024, at more than twice the Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) target of 3 percent by 2030

According to the World Bank's Remittance Prices Worldwide (RPW) database, the global average cost of sending $200 was 6.3 percent in 2024Q4, down from 6.6 percent a year earlier. The global average cost for digital remittances, which account for 29 percent of total transactions collected in the RPW database, was 4.6 percent in 2024Q4, while the cost for nondigital remittances was 6.9 percent. This trend reflects that remittance costs tend to be lower when remittances are sent through digital channels or through money transmitters offering cash-to-cash services than through banks.

The cost of sending money from the G20 (Group of Twenty) countries, which represented a significant source of remittances globally, decreased slightly to 6.5 percent in 2024Q4 from a year earlier. It is slightly higher than the global average cost. There is substantial variance in the cost of remitting from G20 countries (figure 1). South Africa (10.8 percent) is the costliest source, followed by Brazil (7.7 percent). The cost is lowest in France (at 5.1 percent), followed by Australia (at 5.4 percent).

Among developing-country regions, the average cost continued to be the lowest in South Asia at 4.5 percent, and the region also experienced significant decrease of 131 basis points from a year ago. The average cost was the highest in Sub-Saharan Africa at 8.2 percent (figure 2). In contrast, all other developing-country regions posted an increase in total average costs, with exception of Latin America and the Caribbean. Remittance costs across many African corridors remain significantly high.

Banks continue to be the costliest channel for sending remittances, with an average cost of 13.4 percent during 2024Q4, up from 12 percent from a year earlier. The average cost for post offices was 6.9 percent, money transfer operators at 5 percent, and mobile operators at 1.2 percent. While mobile operations remain the cheapest type of service provider, they only account for a very small share of (less than 1 percent) total transaction volume.

Figure 1. Average cost of remitting from G20 countries in 2024Q2



Figure 2. How Much Does It Cost to Send $200? Regional Remittance Costs, 2023-24



Custodian agency(ies): World Bank