

# 8 DECENT WORK AND ECONOMIC GROWTH



## The Sustainable Development Goals Extended Report 2022

**Note:** The Statistics Division of the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UNSD) prepares the annual The Sustainable Development Goals Report, also known as the glossy report, based on storyline inputs submitted by UN international agencies in their capacity as mandated custodian agencies for the SDG indicators. However, due to space constraints, not all information received from custodian agencies is able to be included in the final glossy report. Therefore, in order to provide the general public with all information regarding the indicators, this 'Extended Report' has been prepared by UNSD. It includes all storyline contents for each indicator as provided by the custodian agencies and is unedited. For instances where the custodian agency has not submitted a storyline for an indicator, please see the custodian agency focal point information linked for further information.

## Contents

Indicator 8.1.1: Annual growth rate of real GDP per capita.....	2
Indicator 8.2.1: Annual growth rate of real GDP per employed person .....	3
Indicator 8.3.1: Proportion of informal employment in total employment, by sector and sex.....	4
Indicator 8.4.1/12.2.1: Material footprint, material footprint per capita, and material footprint per GDP .....	5
Indicator 8.4.2/12.2.2: Domestic material consumption, domestic material consumption per capita, and domestic material consumption per GDP .....	6
Indicator 8.5.1: Average hourly earnings of employees, by sex, age, occupation and persons with disabilities .....	7
Indicator 8.5.2: Unemployment rate, by sex, age and persons with disabilities.....	7
Indicator 8.6.1: Proportion of youth (aged 15–24 years) not in education, employment or training .....	8
Indicator 8.7.1: Proportion and number of children aged 5–17 years engaged in child labour, by sex and age.....	9
Indicator 8.8.1: Fatal and non-fatal occupational injuries per 100,000 workers, by sex and migrant status .....	10
Indicator 8.8.2: Level of national compliance with labour rights (freedom of association and collective bargaining) based on International Labour Organization (ILO) textual sources and national legislation, by sex and migrant status.....	10
Indicator 8.9.1: Tourism direct GDP as a proportion of total GDP and in growth rate .....	11
Indicator 8.10.1: (a) Number of commercial bank branches per 100,000 adults and (b) number of automated teller machines (ATMs) per 100,000 adults .....	12
Indicator 8.10.2: Proportion of adults (15 years and older) with an account at a bank or other financial institution or with a mobile-money-service provider .....	12
Indicator 8.a.1: Aid for Trade commitments and disbursements .....	13
Indicator 8.b.1: Existence of a developed and operationalized national strategy for youth employment, as a distinct strategy or as part of a national employment strategy.....	14

**Target 8.1: Sustain per capita economic growth in accordance with national circumstances and, in particular, at least 7 per cent gross domestic product growth per annum in the least developed countries**

**Indicator 8.1.1: Annual growth rate of real GDP per capita**

**GDP pc growth**

*Sustained, inclusive and sustainable economic growth*


Global real GDP per capita increased at an average annual rate of 1.8 per cent from 2014 to 2019, but decreased sharply by 4.4 per cent in 2020 due to the COVID pandemic. It is estimated that global real GDP per capita will increase again by 4.4 per cent in 2021 and is projected to increase by 3.0 per cent in 2022 and 2.5 per cent in 2023<sup>1</sup>. Following an increase of 5 percent in 2019 the real GDP of the least developed countries recorded no growth in 2020, because of the disruption caused by the pandemic. The real GDP of the least developed countries is estimated to increase by 1.4 per cent in 2021 and projected to increase by 4.0 per cent in 2022 and 5.7 per cent in 2023. However, it is expected that the growth in real GDP of the least developed countries will remain well below the 7 per cent target envisioned by the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.

*Average annual growth rate of real GDP in LDCs*


The growth in real GDP for LDCs accelerated from an average annual rate of 5.8 per cent in the period 2000 to 2004 to 6.9 per cent over the period 2005 to 2009, before it slowed down to average annual rate of 5.5 per cent in the period 2010 to 2014 and 3.6 per cent in the period 2015 to 2020, which are less than the target of 7 per cent.

Global real GDP per capita increased at an average annual rate of 2.1 per cent in the period 2010-2014, but slow down to an increase at an average annual rate of only 0.8 per cent in the period 2015-2020. This lower rate of growth in the 2015-2020 period can be attributed to the moderately lower growth in most regions of the world while the real GDP per capita actually decreased in the Latin America and Caribbean, Sub-Saharan Africa and Oceania (excluding Australia and New Zealand) regions. The average growth in real GDP per capita for least developing countries and landlocked developing countries fell sharply from an average annual rate of 3.1 per cent and 3.9 per cent, respectively, during the period 2010-2014 to 1.2 per cent and 0.6 per cent, respectively, in the period 2015-2020.


Annual growth in real GDP and real GDP per capita



Average annual growth of real GDP in LDCs



Average annual growth of real GDP per capita, 2010-2014 and 2015-2020



**Storyline author(s)/contributor(s):** Herman Smith, UNSD  
**Custodian agency(ies):** UNSD

<sup>1</sup> Estimates and projections are obtained from WESP 2022, Table A.4, p. 169 available at: [https://www.un.org/development/desa/dpad/wp-content/uploads/sites/45/publication/WESP2022\\_web.pdf](https://www.un.org/development/desa/dpad/wp-content/uploads/sites/45/publication/WESP2022_web.pdf)

## Target 8.2: Achieve higher levels of economic productivity through diversification, technological upgrading and innovation, including through a focus on high-value added and labour-intensive sectors

### Indicator 8.2.1: Annual growth rate of real GDP per employed person

#### The disproportionate impact of the pandemic on small firms leads to volatile productivity developments


Labour productivity, measured as the average output generated per worker (or per hour worked), is a key indicator of the efficiency of a country's economy and labour market. The impact of the COVID-19 pandemic resulted in unprecedented and volatile developments in global labour productivity levels. In 2020, the pandemic led to sharp declines in both output and employment, and global output per worker dropped by 0.6 per cent, the first such decline since 2009. However, working hours plunged by 8.9 per cent, a far greater impact than the 3.2 per cent decline in employment. As a result, measured on a per-hour basis, productivity surged by 4.9 per cent during 2020, more than double the long-run average growth rate.

Emerging evidence suggests that an important and worrying compositional effect underpinned the surge in productivity per hour worked in 2020: lower productivity firms and sectors and lower-paid workers were disproportionately affected by the pandemic, while high-productivity enterprises and high earners saw far less damage.

Many small firms are engaged in the sectors hardest hit by pandemic-related restrictions, including restaurants and face-to-face service sector activities. At the same time, smaller firms are also disadvantaged in terms of access to capital, and they face higher average debt ratios, severely limiting their capacity to maintain output and threatening their prospects to remain viable over an extended period facing such a large shock to demand. Small firms in low- and lower-middle-income countries are particularly vulnerable, as they benefit less from government assistance programmes.

In terms of regional developments, Sub-Saharan Africa saw the largest decline in output per worker in 2020, at -2.4 per cent. This was followed by Northern America and Europe at -2.0 per cent. In contrast, the Latin America and the Caribbean region, which saw particularly steep employment losses in 2020, registered an increase in output per worker of 2.1 per cent during the year. In 2021, preliminary estimates suggest that global output per worker rebounded sharply, rising by 3.2 per cent. However, productivity in the LDCs declined by 1.6 per cent during the year. As a result of these dynamics, the productivity gap between developing and advanced economies has grown during the pandemic. In 2021, the average worker in a high-income country produced 13.6 times more output than the average worker in a low-income country, up from a ratio of 13.2 in 2019.

Growth in output per worker, 2015-2021, selected regions



#### Additional resources, press releases, etc. with links:

- ILO Monitor: COVID-19 and the world of work. Eighth edition [https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/---dcomm/documents/briefingnote/wcms\\_824092.pdf](https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/---dcomm/documents/briefingnote/wcms_824092.pdf)
- World Employment and Social Outlook – Trends 2022 [https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/---dcomm/---publ/documents/publication/wcms\\_834081.pdf](https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/---dcomm/---publ/documents/publication/wcms_834081.pdf)

**Custodian agency(ies):** ILO

**Target 8.3: Promote development-oriented policies that support productive activities, decent job creation, entrepreneurship, creativity and innovation, and encourage the formalization and growth of micro-, small- and medium-sized enterprises, including through access to financial services**

**Indicator 8.3.1: Proportion of informal employment in total employment, by sector and sex**


**During the pandemic, informal employment often did not play its traditional countercyclical role of absorbing displaced workers from the formal sector**

In 2019, 2 billion people worldwide worked in the informal economy in jobs that are characterized by low job quality and lack of social protection. In the early stages of the pandemic, in countries characterized by dual labour markets, informal employment often did not play its traditional countercyclical role of absorbing displaced workers from the formal sector.

Emerging evidence from 29 countries with available data show that informal employment was disproportionately affected by job losses in 2020 in all regions except Central Asia and Southern Asia (data were not available for any countries in Oceania). In Latin America and the Caribbean, informally employed workers were twice as likely to lose their jobs than their formal counterparts. This occurred for several reasons: the fact that widespread informality is found in heavily affected sectors where lockdown and containment measures prevented informal workers from engaging in their activities, and where the possibility of telework is limited; the relative ease of terminating informal employment relationships; and the fact that informal workers are often employed in smaller enterprises, which have had less access to support measures, including worker retention schemes.

As economic activity gradually resumed, informal employment, especially self-employment, has had a strong rebound in some regions and many informal workers have returned from inactivity. For example, informal jobs accounted for over 70 per cent of net job creation since mid-2020 in many Latin American countries.

It is important to note that a large share of the informally employed are own-account workers who operate their own economic enterprises, or engage independently in a profession or trade, but hire no employees. Contributing family workers participate in family-owned activities without any contract or pay, and so they are informal by definition. The shock to the labour market has pushed many affected workers to work in family enterprises, such that the incidence of contributing family workers increased in both 2020 and 2021, counteracting a long-term trend of decline. Overall, the incidence of own-account workers and contributing family members remained unchanged from 2019 to 2021, at 43.4 per cent of total employment.



**Additional resources, press releases, etc. with links:**

- World Employment and Social Outlook Trends, 2021. [https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/---dcomm/---publ/documents/publication/wcms\\_795453.pdf](https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/---dcomm/---publ/documents/publication/wcms_795453.pdf)
- World Employment and Social Outlook Trends, 2022. [https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/---dcomm/---publ/documents/publication/wcms\\_834081.pdf](https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/---dcomm/---publ/documents/publication/wcms_834081.pdf)

**Custodian agency(ies):** ILO

**Target 8.4: Improve progressively, through 2030, global resource efficiency in consumption and production and endeavour to decouple economic growth from environmental degradation, in accordance with the 10-Year Framework of Programmes on Sustainable Consumption and Production, with developed countries taking the lead**

**Indicator 8.4.1/12.2.1: Material footprint, material footprint per capita, and material footprint per GDP**

**The worlds reliance on natural resources continues to growth**

It has to be clearly stated that indicators of direct material flows, such as the domestic material consumption, do not account for all global material flows related to final consumption in a country or region, as indirect (or embodied) materials of imported and exported products are not considered. Hence, indicators of direct material flows cannot account for the actual environmental consequences generated by the consumption of certain products, as material flows can be located in other world regions. Assessing global material use related to final consumption requires other MFA-based indicators, such as material footprints. Thus, domestic material consumption reports the actual amount of material in an economy, while material footprint – the virtual amount required across the whole supply chain to service final demand.

Analyzing the last 20 years, the global material footprint continues to grow. Overall, it increased from 57.1 billion tonnes in 2000 to 95.9 billion tonnes in 2019. At the same time, its growth slows down. Thus, the average annual growth rate of the global material footprint for 2015–2019 was 1.1 per cent, while for 2000–2019 it was 2.8 per cent. This indicates a slowdown in the growth of pressure of the economy on the environment.


The material footprint reflects the amount of primary materials, including biomass, fossil fuels, metal ores and non-metallic minerals, required to meet humans basic needs. The global material footprint has increased for all types of materials (see chart 1).

At the same time, some changes took place in the structure of the material footprint. In 2019, compared to 2000, the share of biomass and fossil fuels decreased, while metal ores and non-metallic minerals increased (see chart 2).


Traditionally, the material footprint is also analyzed per capita and per GDP. Given the growth trends in global GDP and world population, growth in the material footprint is smoothing out relative to these variables (see chart 3). However, the per capita footprint is on an upward trend.

Natural resources continue to be an essential input for the production processes that stimulate economic growth. But, economic outputs from the depletion of non-renewable and renewable resources is limited. Continued dependence on natural resources exacerbates pressure on sensitive ecosystems and ultimately affects human health and the economy.


**Material footprint by type of material, billion tonnes**



**Structure of material footprint, per cent**



**Dynamics of the material footprint, material footprint per capita, and material footprint per GDP**



**Additional resources, press releases, etc. with links:**

- <https://www.resourcepanel.org/global-material-flows-database>;
- UNEP (2021). The use of natural resources in the economy: A Global Manual on Economy Wide Material Flow Accounting. Nairobi, Kenya: <https://wedocs.unep.org/bitstream/handle/20.500.11822/36253/UNRE.pdf?sequence=3&isAllowed=y>

**Storyline author(s)/contributor(s):** Ekaterina Poleshchuk, UNEP; Ralf Heidrich, UNEP

**Custodian agency(ies):** UNEP

## Indicator 8.4.2/12.2.2: Domestic material consumption, domestic material consumption per capita, and domestic material consumption per GDP

### The domestic material consumption increased over the past 20 years and in 2019 amounted to 95.1 gigatons or 12.3 tons per capita

The domestic material consumption (DMC) indicator is currently the most widely used MFA-based indicators in policy processes. DMC measures the total amount of material directly used in an economy and based on accounts of direct material flows, i.e. domestic material extraction and physical imports and exports.


DMC has high environmental relevance as an indicator of potential environmental pressure on a domestic territory. Because of this, this indicator is highly important for the development of environment policy. DMC increased throughout the analyzed period from 2000 and in 2019 amounted to 95.1 gigatons or 12.3 tons per capita. This trend was typical for all DMC components such as biomass, metal ores, non-metallic minerals and fossil fuels (see chart 1).

At the same time, in the structure of DMC, there is a decrease in the shares of biomass and fossil fuels and an increase in the share of metal ores and non-metallic minerals (see chart 2). Thus, the share of biomass decreased by 5.7 percentage points from 2000 to 2019, while the share of non-metallic minerals increased by 5.3 percentage points over the same time period.


The environmental pressure is unevenly distributed around the world. Over the past 20 years, about 70% of global DMC have been in Eastern Asia and South-eastern Asia, as well as Northern America and Europe. At the same time, when analyzing the regional structure of global DMC, one should note a decrease in the shares of DMC in Northern America and Europe from 36% in 2000 to 22% in 2019 and an increase in Eastern Asia and South-eastern Asia from 31% to 43% over the same time period (see chart 3).

DMC has high environmental relevance as an indicator of potential environmental pressure on a domestic territory. DMC covers all materials used on the input side, which actually flow through the domestic economy and which are either emitted back to the environment as waste and emissions or contribute to the increase of the national physical stock with potential flows of waste and emissions in the future (Marra Campanale and Femia 2013). Current DMC trends by type of raw material and territory reflect the clear hotspots for resource management measures related to domestic material consumption at global, regional and national levels.


Domestic material consumption, by type of raw material in 2000-2019 (gigatons)



Structure of domestic material consumption by type of raw material in 2000-2019 (percentage)



Structure of domestic material consumption by territory in 2000-2019 (percentage)



#### Additional resources, press releases, etc. with links:

- UNEP (2021). The use of natural resources in the economy: A Global Manual on Economy Wide Material Flow Accounting. Nairobi, Kenya: <https://wedocs.unep.org/bitstream/handle/20.500.11822/36253/UNRE.pdf?sequence=3&isAllowed=y>

Storyline author(s)/contributor(s): Ekaterina Poleshchuk, UNEP

Custodian agency(ies): UNEP

## Target 8.5: By 2030, achieve full and productive employment and decent work for all women and men, including for young people and persons with disabilities, and equal pay for work of equal value

### Indicator 8.5.1: Average hourly earnings of employees, by sex, age, occupation and persons with disabilities

Custodian agency(ies): ILO

### Indicator 8.5.2: Unemployment rate, by sex, age and persons with disabilities


#### Global unemployment in 2021 remains higher than pre-pandemic levels, with slow and uneven recovery across regions

In 2021, the global unemployment rate declined slightly to 6.2 per cent, which is still well above the pre-pandemic rate of 5.4 per cent. This represents 28 million more unemployed persons. The ILO projects that unemployment will remain above its 2019 level until at least 2023. Meanwhile, the level of unemployment underestimates the full employment impact of the crisis since many who left the labour force have not come back. The inactivity rate was 41.0 per cent in 2021, 1.5 percentage points above that of 2019. This translates into 147 million more persons outside the labour force, a number that is expected to keep growing. Moreover, the unemployment rate does not reflect the reduction in working hours for those that remained employed. In 2021, 4.3 per cent of global working hours were lost relative to the fourth quarter of 2019, which is equivalent to a deficit of 125 million full-time jobs (assuming a 48-hour working week).

Thus far, the labour market recovery has been inadequate and unequal. It has been fastest in high-income countries, with the unemployment rate decreasing the most in 2021 in Europe, Northern America, Australia and New Zealand. Meanwhile, it increased in LDCs, LLDCs and SIDS. As in pre-pandemic times, the unemployment rate remained by far the highest in Northern Africa (12.9 per cent) and Latin America and the Caribbean (10.0 per cent). These are also the regions where the gender gaps are the largest and have grown as a result of the crisis. Women in Northern Africa had an unemployment rate of 23.9 per cent in 2021, compared to 9.6 per cent for men. Globally, women's unemployment rate was 0.3 percentage points higher than that of men.

The groups that were disproportionately impacted since the onset of the pandemic – women and youth – are now having the hardest time recovering. For example, the unemployment rate for women stood at 6.4 per cent in 2021, a mere 0.1 percentage points lower than 2020. Similarly, youth continued to have higher unemployment rates than before the pandemic in 40 out of 46 countries with available quarterly data in 2021. There is now emerging evidence that persons with disabilities were hit harder as well. This is alarming since the unemployment rate for people with disabilities was already higher than for those without in most countries, and this does not reflect the reality that they are less likely to participate in the labour market. The (unweighted) average difference between the unemployment rates of persons with and without disabilities in the 25 countries with available data jumped from 1.2 percentage points in 2019 to 2.1 points in 2020.

Unemployment rate, 2019-2021



#### Additional resources, press releases, etc. with links:

- ILO Monitor: COVID-19 and the world of work. Eighth edition [https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/---dcomm/documents/briefingnote/wcms\\_824092.pdf](https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/---dcomm/documents/briefingnote/wcms_824092.pdf)
- World Employment and Social Outlook – Trends 2022 [https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/---dcomm/---publ/documents/publication/wcms\\_834081.pdf](https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/---dcomm/---publ/documents/publication/wcms_834081.pdf)
- ILOSTAT blog “International Day of Persons with Disabilities: How disability affects labour market outcomes” <https://ilostat.ilo.org/international-day-of-persons-with-disabilities-how-disability-affects-labour-market-outcomes/>

Custodian agency(ies): ILO



## Target 8.6: By 2020, substantially reduce the proportion of youth not in employment, education or training

### Indicator 8.6.1: Proportion of youth (aged 15–24 years) not in education, employment or training

#### Share of youth not in employment, education or training at an all-time high


The proportion of the world's youth not in education, employment or training (NEET) is now at its highest level since 2005 (when the series began). The NEET rate had remained unchanged from 2015 to 2019 at 21.8 per cent, but increased slightly to 23.3 per cent in 2020 as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic. This represents an increase of almost 20 million youth not in education, employment or training. The pandemic and related containment measures disproportionately affected youth employment, as well as their education and training prospects. Although youth represented only 13 per cent of total employment before the crisis (2019), they made up 34.2 per cent of the 2020 decline in employment. Meanwhile, both technical and vocational education and on-the-job training suffered massive disruption, forcing many young people to quit their studies.

Regional disparities in youth NEET rates are striking and have remained persistent. Central and Southern Asia and Western Asia and Northern Africa each had NEET rates of 30.8 per cent in 2020, whereas the situation was much less dire for youth in Northern America and Europe (12.9 per cent) and Australia and New Zealand (10.4 per cent). Nonetheless, NEET rates rose across all regions in 2020 with increases of at least 2 percentage points recorded in Latin America and the Caribbean and Northern America and Europe.

Globally, young women are much more likely to find themselves not in employment, education or training. In 2020, the NEET rate was 31.5 per cent for young women, compared to 15.7 per cent for young men. This gap was no different in 2005, meaning that young women have been more than twice as likely as young men to be jobless and not in education nor training for the last 15 years.

Although the share of NEET is higher for women than men in all regions, the magnitude of the gender gap varies across regions. The situation for young women continues to be alarming in Central and Southern Asia, where almost half were not in employment, education or training in 2020 (47.5 per cent) compared to 15.6 per cent of young men. Similarly worrisome, in Western Asia and Northern Africa, 41.8 per cent of young women were not in employment, education or training, while the NEET rate was half of that for young men, at 20.4 per cent.

The pandemic resulted in a growing number of youth who are neither gaining professional experience through a job nor developing skills through an educational or vocational program. This will likely leave a lasting impact on these youth as they seek to transition into the labour market. Efforts to reduce NEET rates, with a focus on young women, need to be intensified significantly as the world seeks to recover from the COVID-19 crisis.



#### Additional resources, press releases, etc. with links:

- ILOSTAT blog: Not in employment, education or training: the reality for many young rural women, available at <https://ilostat.ilo.org/not-in-employment-education-or-training-the-reality-for-many-young-rural-women/>
- ILO Monitor: COVID-19 and the world of work. Fourth edition [https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/@dgreports/@dcomm/documents/briefingnote/wcms\\_745963.pdf](https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/@dgreports/@dcomm/documents/briefingnote/wcms_745963.pdf)
- ILO Monitor: COVID-19 and the world of work. Seventh edition [https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/---dcomm/documents/briefingnote/wcms\\_767028.pdf](https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/---dcomm/documents/briefingnote/wcms_767028.pdf)
- ILO Monitor: COVID-19 and the world of work. Eighth edition [https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/---dcomm/documents/briefingnote/wcms\\_824092.pdf](https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/---dcomm/documents/briefingnote/wcms_824092.pdf)
- Youth & COVID-19: Impacts on jobs, education, rights and mental well-being [https://www.ilo.org/global/topics/youth-employment/publications/WCMS\\_753026/lang-en/index.htm](https://www.ilo.org/global/topics/youth-employment/publications/WCMS_753026/lang-en/index.htm)

Custodian agency(ies): ILO

**Target 8.7: Take immediate and effective measures to eradicate forced labour, end modern slavery and human trafficking and secure the prohibition and elimination of the worst forms of child labour, including recruitment and use of child soldiers, and by 2025 end child labour in all its forms**

**Indicator 8.7.1: Proportion and number of children aged 5–17 years engaged in child labour, by sex and age**

### Child labour rises to 160 million – first increase in two decades

Worldwide, 160 million children (63 million girls and 97 million boys) were engaged in child labour at the beginning of 2020, representing an increase of 8.4 million children in the last four years. This represents almost 1 in 10 of all children worldwide. Seventy-nine million children – nearly half of all those in child labour – were in hazardous work that directly endangers their health, safety and moral development.

Global progress against child labour has stagnated since 2016; however, there has been continued progress in Asia and the Pacific and Latin America and the Caribbean. Progress in reducing child labour in sub-Saharan Africa has proven elusive. There are now more children in child labour in sub-Saharan Africa than in the rest of the world combined.

Additional economic shocks and school closures caused by COVID-19 mean that children already in child labour may be working longer hours or under worsening conditions, while many more may be forced into the worst forms of child labour due to job and income losses among vulnerable families. The COVID-19 crisis threatens to further erode global progress against child labour unless urgent mitigation measures are taken. The latest evidence warns that globally 9 million additional children are at risk of being pushed into child labour by the end of 2022 as a result of rising poverty driven by the pandemic.

**Additional resources, press releases, etc. with links:**

- <https://data.unicef.org/resources/child-labour-2020-global-estimates-trends-and-the-road-forward/>
- <https://www.unicef.org/press-releases/child-labour-rises-160-million-first-increase-two-decades>
- [https://www.ilo.org/ipec/Informationresources/WCMS\\_747421/lang--en/index.htm](https://www.ilo.org/ipec/Informationresources/WCMS_747421/lang--en/index.htm)

**Storyline author(s)/contributor(s):** Federico Blanco, ILO; Claudia Cappa, UNICEF; Michaelle De Cock, ILO; Lorenzo Guarcello, ILO; Scott Lyon, ILO; Nicole Petrowski, UNICEF

**Custodian agency(ies):** ILO, UNICEF

**Target 8.8: Protect labour rights and promote safe and secure working environments for all workers, including migrant workers, in particular women migrants, and those in precarious employment**

**Indicator 8.8.1: Fatal and non-fatal occupational injuries per 100,000 workers, by sex and migrant status**



Custodian agency(ies): ILO

**Indicator 8.8.2: Level of national compliance with labour rights (freedom of association and collective bargaining) based on International Labour Organization (ILO) textual sources and national legislation, by sex and migrant status**


**There has been continued progress from 2015 to 2020 but the full impact of the pandemic on workers’ right to freedom of association and collective bargaining remains to be seen**

The global average for SDG 8.8.2 indicator in 2020 stood at 5.01. This indicator has a range from 0 to 10, with 0 being the best possible score (indicating higher levels of compliance with freedom of association and collective bargaining rights) and 10 the worst (indicating lower levels of compliance with these rights). While violations of workers’ and employers’ right to organize and bargain collectively remained substantial, there has been steady progress since 2015 as measured by SDG indicator 8.8.2. The indicator stood at 5.11 in 2019 and at 5.29 in 2018. From 2019 to 2020, most country-level scores remained unchanged with average scores changing little in regions for which the indicator is reported.

Compared to 2015, regions that saw a slight improvement are Oceania (from 1.89 in 2015 to 1.78 in 2020, excluding Australia and New Zealand) and Central and Southern Asia (from 5.18 in 2015 to 4.35 in 2020). While the indicator shows a deterioration among least developed countries (from 3.1 in 2015 to 3.64 in 2020), in all other regions it changed little over the period.

The full impact of COVID-19 pandemic on workers’ right to freedom of association and collective bargaining remains to be seen. Nonetheless, while the ILO’s Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations in its 2020 and 2021 meetings noted that “in some countries, exceptional measures have led to temporary restrictions including the setting aside of collective bargaining mechanisms and the resulting collective bargaining agreements”, it also noted that “in several countries collective bargaining mechanisms have played an important role in identifying responses to the crisis”.

**Level of compliance with labour rights World and regional averages for SDG indicator 8.8.2 (2015-2020)**



**Additional resources, press releases, etc. with links:**

- SDG indicator 8.8.2 seeks to measure the level of national compliance with fundamental labour rights (freedom of association and collective bargaining). It is based on six International Labour Organization (ILO) supervisory body textual sources and also on national legislation. National law is not enacted for the purpose of generating a statistical indicator of compliance with fundamental rights, nor were any of the ILO textual sources created for this purpose. Indicator 8.8.2 is compiled from these sources and its use does not constitute a waiver of the respective ILO Constituents’ divergent points of view on the sources’ conclusions. SDG indicator 8.8.2 is not intended as a tool to compare compliance among ILO member States. It should specifically be noted that reporting obligations of an ILO member State to the ILO’s supervisory system and thus ILO textual sources are different for ratifying and non-ratifying ILO member States.
- [1] Application of International Labour Standards 2021. Addendum to the 2020 Report of the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations. International Labour Conference 109th Session, 2021. Para. 72. See at: [https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed\\_norm/---relconf/documents/meetingdocument/wcms\\_771042.pdf](https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_norm/---relconf/documents/meetingdocument/wcms_771042.pdf)

Custodian agency(ies): ILO

## Target 8.9: By 2030, devise and implement policies to promote sustainable tourism that creates jobs and promotes local culture and products

### Indicator 8.9.1: Tourism direct GDP as a proportion of total GDP and in growth rate

#### Global GDP from tourism nearly halved between 2019 and 2020 ,with consequences for jobs, local businesses and conservation efforts


The state of tourism before the pandemic was one of uninterrupted growth, with an average 5% growth between 2009 and 2019 that outpaced that of the world economy. The economic contribution of tourism to the global economy was estimated at 4% in 2019, its highest on record. Job creation in tourism was higher than the economic average. Across all countries with available data since 2000, average growth in total employment was 1.4% while in tourism it was 3.8%.

In 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic plunged the tourism sector in an unprecedented crisis. Global GDP from tourism nearly halved between 2019 and 2020, making tourism one of the economic sectors most affected by the pandemic.

Tourism is an important part of many economies and contributes to sustain millions of businesses, jobs and livelihoods the world over. While practically all countries saw their economies significantly affected by reduced tourism activity, some countries and regions suffered more than others, depending on the barriers put in place to contain the outbreak, such as travel restrictions and national lockdowns, and also on the existence of a strong domestic tourism market that could help to compensate for the drastic fall in international tourism. This redistribution of tourism flows and income has impacted various elements of sustainable tourism development: from difficulties in managing excessively high visitation in otherwise tranquil domestic destinations, to the challenges of—in the absence of tourism income—maintaining the protection of natural areas, jobs and livelihoods. Some places, for example, have seen a rise in poaching and other harmful practices as a result of reduced tourism income.

Whereas tourism and its contribution to GDP is expected to recover gradually over 2021 and 2022 due to the consolidation of domestic tourism markets, the increase of tourism expenditure per visitor and improvements on inbound tourism flows, there are still potential risks that might disrupt the recovery, including the war in Ukraine and the emergence of new COVID-19 variants.

COVID-19 impact on the contributions of tourism to global GDP



#### Additional resources, press releases, etc. with links:

- Tourism data: <https://www.unwto.org/tourism-statistics-database>
- SDG data for targets 8.9 and 12.b: <https://www.unwto.org/tourism-statistics/economic-contribution-SDG>
- UNWTO Barometer, January 2022 edition <https://www.unwto.org/news/tourism-grows-4-in-2021-but-remains-far-below-pre-pandemic-levels>
- Economic Contribution of tourism and the impact of COVID-19 <https://www.e-unwto.org/doi/epdf/10.18111/9789284423200>
- UNWTO press release <https://www.unwto.org/news/tourism-enjoys-strong-start-to-2022-while-facing-new-uncertainties>

Storyline author(s)/contributor(s): Clara van der Pol, UNWTO; Leandry Moreno, UNWTO; Eric Hernandez, UNWTO

Custodian agency(ies): UNWTO

**Target 8.10: Strengthen the capacity of domestic financial institutions to encourage and expand access to banking, insurance and financial services for all**

**Indicator 8.10.1: (a) Number of commercial bank branches per 100,000 adults and (b) number of automated teller machines (ATMs) per 100,000 adults**


Access to finance has continued to rise across the world since 2015 while new modes of financial access have gained relevance, growing even more rapidly since the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic.

The number of ATMs per 100,000 adults increased globally from 65.3 in 2015 to 67.3 in 2020. The fastest growth was observed in Central and Southern Asia with an annual growth rate of 5 percent. Other regions such as Central Asia and Southern Asia, Eastern Asia and South-eastern Asia, and Western Asia and Northern Africa also experienced an increase. In Least Developed Countries (LDCs) and Landlocked Developing Countries (LLDCs), the number of ATMs per 100,000 adults grew annually by more than 7 percent between 2015 and 2020, reaching 7.6 and 16.6 ATMs per 100,000 adults in 2020, respectively. On the other hand, this indicator remained broadly stable in Small Island Developing States (SIDS).


The growth of commercial bank branches per 100,000 adults worldwide has seen a slight reversal in 2020 relative to its level in 2015, declining from 15.2 to 14.4 during this period. This is a result of the decreasing trend in bank branches in advanced economies to reduce costs, and the move towards the adoption of digital financial services such as mobile and internet banking. North America and Europe, and Oceania experienced the largest decline in bank branches between 2015 and 2020, with negative annual growth of 3 percent. The levels in Eastern Asia and South-eastern Asia, and Sub-Saharan Africa have remained broadly stable over the past five years. In contrast, however, Landlocked Developing Countries (LLDCs) experienced the fastest annual growth of 6 percent between 2015 and 2020.

The COVID-19 pandemic seemed to have reinforced the use of digital modes of financial access further while more traditional modes of accessing finance captured by the two indicators decline globally and in most regions from 2019 to 2020.

**8.10.1: (a) Number of commercial bank branches per 100,000 adults**



**8.10.1: (b) Number of ATMs per 100,000 adults**



**Additional resources, press releases, etc. with links:**

- [IMF FAS 2021 Press Release](#)
- [IMF FAS 2021 Trends and Developments](#)
- [Measuring Financial Access: 10 Years of the IMF Financial Access Survey](#)

**Storyline author(s)/contributor(s):** Kazuko Shirono, IMF; Katia Huayta-Zapata, IMF; Hector Carcel-Villanova, IMF; Artak Harutyunyan, IMF

**Custodian agency(ies):** IMF

**Indicator 8.10.2: Proportion of adults (15 years and older) with an account at a bank or other financial institution or with a mobile-money-service provider**

**Custodian agency(ies):** World Bank

## Target 8.a: Increase Aid for Trade support for developing countries, in particular least developed countries, including through the Enhanced Integrated Framework for Trade-related Technical Assistance to Least Developed Countries

### Indicator 8.a.1: Aid for Trade commitments and disbursements

#### Aid for trade increases to address economic and trade impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic

In 2020, aid for trade commitments increased by 2.2% in real terms to USD 55.8 billion. USD 4.2 billion of these commitments were aimed at addressing the COVID-19 economic and trade-related impacts. The most represented sectors in 2020 were transport and storage (29% of total aid for trade commitments), energy (19.6%), and banking & financial services (17.6%).

In 2020, aid for trade disbursements decreased by 8.5% in real terms to USD 43.1 billion. Geographically, aid for trade focused on Africa and Asia, which received each 34.8% of total disbursements, followed by America (11.6%), Europe (6%) and Oceania (1.5%). In terms of income groups, lower-middle income countries received 36.3% of aid for trade, followed by least developed countries (25.3%) and upper middle-income countries (15.9%).

**Storyline author(s)/contributor(s):** Yasmin Ahmad, OECD

**[Custodian agency\(ies\):](#)** OECD

## Target 8.b: By 2020, develop and operationalize a global strategy for youth employment and implement the Global Jobs Pact of the International Labour Organization


**Indicator 8.b.1: Existence of a developed and operationalized national strategy for youth employment, as a distinct strategy or as part of a national employment strategy**

### More countries operationalise strategies for youth employment, but youth inclusiveness needs to improve

Data for this reporting period show the increasing development and implementation of national youth employment strategies across most regions. Out of 81 countries with data, more than half (53 per cent) have operationalised such strategies. This represents an additional 10 countries with an operationalised strategy compared to the previous reporting period. Meanwhile, slightly less than one third (31 per cent) have developed one but did not provide conclusive evidence on implementation. Only 10 countries (12 per cent) reported to be in the process of developing a strategy, and just 3 countries (4 per cent) declared not to have one.

Labour law and legislation measures have been reported by 48 countries as part of their national youth employment strategies, including 65 per cent of the countries with an implemented strategy and 89 per cent of those with only a developed strategy. This reflects the importance given to the quality of employment on aspects such as contractual agreements for young people, anti-discrimination legislation and occupational safety and health for young workers. Interestingly, less than one third of the countries with data (28 per cent) have fully involved youth-led organizations in their strategies, although almost half of them (46 per cent) have at least informed, consulted, or partially involve them – while more than one quarter (26 per cent) indicated not to involve youth-led organizations. The inclusiveness of youth groups identified as particularly vulnerable or disadvantaged is part of most national strategies for youth employment – 85 per cent of the countries with data. While 70 per cent of countries target low skilled workers, 67 per cent target young women and young people with disabilities, 51 per cent youth not in employment, education, or training (NEET), 37 per cent migrant workers, and only 30 per cent rural workers.

Number of national strategies for youth employment by status of the SDG Indicator 8.b.1, February 2022



**Custodian agency(ies):** ILO