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Background document
Available in English only

Statistical framework to measure corruption

Prepared by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime

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Abstract

This document provides the first draft of a comprehensive statistical framework to measure corruption for consideration by the UN Statistical Commission. In addition to presenting the framework, the document describes UNODC’s mandate to develop the framework together with the mandate to develop global standards to measure different types of crime, the objective of the framework, its development process, and the challenges to measure corruption. The proposed conceptual framework considers the different manifestations of corruption through direct and indirect measures, including outcome indicators and indicators on risks and responses. The paper also provides the metadata that describes and defines each of the indicators listed in the framework.

I. Objective of the document

1. The objective of this paper is present to the UN Statistical Commission a statistical framework to measure corruption. The framework proposed in this paper is an ambitious set of indicators that requires an holistic national system of statistical and non-statistical sources that probably doesn’t exist in its entirety in any country, but similarly to the SDG indicators framework, the objective is to offer to countries a reference frame to guide national efforts to develop national information systems on corruption. All indicators may take different characteristics based on the administrative and legal frame of national and sub-national entities. All indicators have been described with dedicated metadata in Annex 2, however, it should be noted that the specificity of some of the indicators can only be described at national level.
2. The statistical framework presented in this paper is the result of a number of consultations. An Hybrid Global Consultation was hosted by UNODC on 8 and 9 December 2022 where experts appointed by Member States exchanged their national experiences on corruption measurement and discussed the possible dimensions to measure corruption, In January 2023 UNODC launched a Written Global Consultation to review a draft Statistical Framework to measure corruption prepared on the basis of the consultation with national experts and an internal consultation with experts from the academia and international organizations. 39 Member States provided feedback on the draft proposed framework, through their national statistical offices (16 NSOs provided input), anti-corruption authorities, criminal justice authorities, ministries, think tanks, academia, and civil society organizations.

3. Based on the feedback received from this written global consultation, UNODC developed this second draft of the framework presented to the UN Statistical Commission as room document for E/CN.3/2023/21. The framework is an ambitious set of indicators that requires holistic national systems of statistical and non-statistical sources that probably doesn't exist in its entirety in any country, but similarly to the SDG indicators framework, the objective is to offer to countries a reference frame to guide national efforts to for gradually developing national statistical systems that can measure corruption and monitor progress of the policies to prevent and combat it.

II. Background: past development of global statistical standards on corruption, mandates, and consultation process

4. In 2022, at the fifty-third session of the Statistical Commission, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) reported (E/CN.3/2022/14) together with the National Institute of Statistics and Geography of Mexico (INEGI) on the progress made globally to implement the road map to improve the quality and availability of crime and criminal justice statistics (E/CN.3/2013/11). The 2013 road map prioritized activities structured around three main pillars:
 - (a) Development of new methodological tools.
 - (b) Promotion of capacity building activities.
 - (c) Strengthening of international data collection and analysis.
5. The 2013 roadmap acknowledged corruption among those emerging and difficult-to-measure crimes that demanded additional methodological development since its measurement presented major weaknesses been often based on indirect or perception-based methodology without a consolidated approach to produce reliable and standardised measurements, and the lack of commonly agreed statistical concepts, methods, tools, and indicators.
6. In 2017, the UN General Assembly adopted the global indicator framework to measure progress on the SDGs. This framework included two indicatorsⁱ to measure progress on target 16.5 *Substantially reduce corruption and bribery in all their forms*. In order to support countries to regularly produce data for these two SDG indicators, UNODC and UNDP produced the *Manual on Corruption Surveys: Methodological Guidelines on the Measurement of Bribery and Other Forms of Corruption through Sample Surveys*. This Manual was welcomed by the Statistical Commission in 2019 at its fiftieth session. The Manual provides technical guidance to measure types of corruption that can be measured through population or business surveys including bribery (and therefore SDG indicators 16.5.1 and 16.5.2), as well as other forms of corruption such as nepotism and vote buying.

7. The importance of corruption measurement is embedded in Article 61 of the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC), which calls on Member States to “consider analysing, in consultation with experts, trends in corruption in their territory, as well as the circumstances in which corruption offences are committed”; and “developing and sharing with each other and through international and regional organizations statistics, analytical expertise concerning corruption and information with a view to developing, insofar as possible, common definitions, standards and methodologies, as well as information on best practices to prevent and combat corruption”. The Convention also states that “each State Party shall consider monitoring its policies and actual measures to combat corruption and making assessments of their effectiveness and efficiency.”
8. At its 8th session, in 2019, the Conference of the States Parties (CoSP) to the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC), adopted the Resolution 8/10 requesting UNODC “to continue expert-level consultations on identifying and refining methodologies on the issue of the measurement of corruption in order to develop proposals on a comprehensive, scientifically sound and objective framework for the purpose of assisting States Parties, upon their request, in measuring corruption, consistent with the Convention”.
9. The Special Session of the General Assembly against corruption (UNGASS), in 2021, adopted the political declaration “Our common commitment to effectively addressing challenges and implementing measures to prevent and combat corruption and strengthen international cooperation”. It encouraged UNODC, in coordination with the UN Statistical Commission and in broad cooperation across the United Nations system, to develop and share a comprehensive, scientifically sound and objective statistical framework, grounded in methodological work and reliable data sources, to support States in their efforts to measure corruption, its impact and all relevant aspects of preventing and combating it, in order to inform and strengthen evidence-based anti-corruption policies and strategies, consistent with the Convention against corruption.
10. UNODC has undertaken a series of activities to implement the UNGASS political declaration and the CoSP resolution on corruption measurement with support from the UNODC-INEGI Center of Excellence for Statistical Information on Government, Crime, Victimization and Justice:
 - a. Between December 2021 – August 2022, UNODC compiled methodologies and frequently used indicators to measure corruption at international, regional, and national levels conducted by government and non-governmental institutions.
 - b. In October 2022, UNODC conducted an internal consultation with experts from academia and international organizations to review existing research findings and international practices on corruption measurement assessing validity, relevance, and feasibility.
 - c. In December 2022, UNODC organized a global hybrid consultation (in person and on-line) with eighty-eight national experts appointed by Member States from thirty-nine countries to review existing practices on measuring corruption at the national level. The international

consultation involved international experts and national experts from National Statistical Offices, anti-corruption agencies, relevant ministries, and law enforcement agencies.

- d. Based on the activities listed above, in January 2023, UNODC developed a first draft of the Statistical Framework to measure corruption that submitted for global review through a written consultation.
- e. In February 2023, a second draft of the framework, included in this document, was developed by UNODC and submitted to the fifty-fourth session of the Statistical Commission.
- f. After the review by the UN Statistical Commission, UNODC will have another consultation with national experts appointed by Member States before submitting the final Statistical Framework to the CoSP of the UN Convention Against Corruption for its review and adoption during its tenth session in late 2023.

III. Objective of the Statistical Framework to measure corruption.

11. The main objective of the comprehensive statistical framework to measure corruption is to provide guidance to national governments to develop national information systems able to detect the presence, measure the magnitude and monitor trends of the different forms of corruption, as per the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC). The framework provides a list of indicators together with guidance on how to analyze the indicators together and on how to collect the needed data. The ultimate goal of the statistical framework is to contribute to the efforts of Member States to build scientific evidence that can underpin the design, implementation, monitoring, and assessment of anti-corruption policies.
12. The Statistical Framework is meant to be used at national level to support countries to develop national statistical systems to measure corruption. Indicators that cut across the different dimensions of corruption can provide comprehensive evidence to address corruption. The framework is comprehensive and includes different types of indicators (direct and indirect indicators).

IV. Challenges to measure corruption

13. Corruption is a complex phenomenon that is difficult to define as it takes many forms and affects all sectors of society. The first challenge to measure it is to clearly define what should be understood by the word corruption, as well as to clearly define conceptual and analytical blocks that can be useful to capture its dimension and impacts across society.
14. Considering the nature of corruption, a single definition of corruption is inadequate to measure it in a comprehensive way. The UN Convention against Corruption defines a set of behaviors that should be criminalized as corruption and a set of measures to prevent it. These definitions were

commonly agreed by member states and provide a solid base for guiding methodological work and for developing standardized indicators that can measure behaviors that are acknowledged worldwide as constituting or being related to corruption by public and private actors.

15. An additional challenge in measuring corruption is that detecting corrupted behaviors is more difficult than detecting other types of crimes as victims and institutions are not always willing or able to report and register its occurrence. The dark figure of corruption- the part of corruption that doesn't come to the attention of authorities and is not recorded – is arguably higher than other forms of crime because of the fear of retaliation and co-responsibility or direct benefit from corrupt endeavors. Those who experience, witness, or identify the different types of corruption are less likely to report it to competent authorities than other crimes.
16. International organisations have made attempts to measure corruption by producing information based on perception-based indicators. Indices such as the World Bank's Control of Corruption indicator or the yearly Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index identify perceptions and drivers of corruption and raise awareness of the negative effects that corruption has on sustainable development but have important limitations as these do not provide sound information on the direct occurrence of corruption and on the different types of corruption, the sectors, procedures, and formalities that are more vulnerable to corruption.
17. Despite the widely recognized limitations of perception-based measures, national systems to monitor corruption are often based on perception surveys, particularly among the general population. The majority of national systems still lack output measurements that describe the direct experience of corruption among citizens, clients of public services, public officials and professional within the private sector.

V. Conceptual statistical framework to measure corruption.

18. The approach considers the complexity of corruption by looking at the different dimensions of corruption together with elements that can describe it. The Framework is constructed through a matrix with two dimensions: types of corruption (based on UNCAC) and type of measurement: perception, output/direct measures (experience of corruption), and indirect measures (risk and response). The framework matrix describes the two dimensions with corruption types in rows and measurement types in column.
19. Direct/Output measures that describe the whole size and direct experience of corruption are best suited to measure levels of corruption and monitor trends because they capture the dark figure of corruption. Alone these measures could serve as the core of corruption measurement, but they are not available for all types of corruption, and they require substantial resources to be embedded in national statistical and anti-corruption systems. While perception is not an ideal measure, it is included in the framework to indirectly measure corruption and as a form of transitional indicator that countries may use until direct measures are fully operational.

20. The types of corruption considered in the framework are based on the UN Convention against Corruption, and include the following concepts:
- a) Corruption areas criminalized in UNCAC.
 - a.1 Bribery of national public officials and persons working in the private sector
 - a.2 Trading in influence
 - a.3 Illicit enrichment
 - a.4 Embezzlement, misappropriation, or other diversion of property by a public official
 - a.5 Abuse of functions
 - a.6 Obstruction of justice
 - b) Preventive measures
 - b.1 Merit-based public hiring
 - b.2 Independence and integrity of the judiciary
 - b.3 Conflict of interest
 - b.4 Management of public finances
 - b.5 Public procurement
 - b.6 Access to public information
 - b.7 Candidature for and election to public office
 - b.8 Preventive measures for the private sector
 - c) Enabling environment to report and address corruption.
 - c.1 International cooperation
 - c.2 Resources allocated to fight corruption
 - c.3 Transparency

VI. Statistical framework to measure the different elements and dimensions of corruption.

21. The statistical framework recognizes the multi-faceted complexity of corruption by incorporating a multiplicity of sources that can include, inter alia, administrative records related to public finances and other procedures within public administration (such as public procurement records, assets declaration records, audit records, access to information records, etc.), household and business sample surveys on corruption, other sample surveys, including surveys of public services, expert-based interviews, individual anonymised records on individual corruption offences, anonymized court casefiles and whistle-blowing files, and administrative records derived from the criminal justice system and civil procedures at all stages of their corresponding processes.

22. The adoption of the framework requires a cross-sectoral and inter-institutional approach. Given the varied array of indicators and data sources included in the framework, its implementation requires the effective collaboration of multiple relevant stakeholders, who might already have the necessary data to build the proposed indicators, and who might just need methodological guidance to produce standardized and reliable statistics. Another important aspect of the framework is that it recognizes the necessity to incorporate the gender perspective into corruption measurement. Where possible, the framework promotes a nuanced analysis of the gender perspective that goes beyond the sex-disaggregation of the data.
23. The statistical framework to measure corruption is presented in a matrix format to list indicators that relate to different forms of corruption as listed in part V and to distinguish between direct or indirect measures.
24. *Direct measures* are about the prevalence of specific types of corruption, particularly bribery. These indicators can typically be produced through population and business surveys, and they are robust, accurate and representative if statistical designs of the surveys are representative of the whole population. The challenge in the implementation of these surveys is that they are usually expensive and not always easy and sustainable to conduct repeatedly. Measuring corruption directly is often not possible due to the context and the nature of the sector. For example, if a sector is by its nature hidden from the public (like financial transactions, defense or areas involving privacy) direct measurement through a survey, would not help to reveal the true scale of corruption because the public would have no direct experience to report.
25. *Indirect measures*: Due to the elusive nature of corruption and the challenge to collect data to measure it directly, indirect measures are included in the framework: while not measuring corruption per se, they can measure elements that may enable or deter corruption. The following indirect measures are considered:
- *Perception indicators*. The measurement of the perception of corruption may include a broad range of attitudes and beliefs (for example, conflict of interest, abuse of power, embezzlement of public funds, etc.). Perception indicators may be influenced by a broad range of subjective factors that may not be directly linked to the incidence of corruption, such as culture, mass communication, and values. Therefore, perception-based measures are not suitable to monitor corruption levels and trends. Measuring perception of corruption together with indicators on direct experience of corruption can provide an understanding of the gap between the perception and the corruption experienced by the surveyed populations as well as their levels of trust in government institutions.
 - *Risk indicators*. These measures provide information on possible existing or non-existing infrastructures and procedures that increase or decrease the risk of corruption occurring, rather than the occurrence of corruption itself. They are useful to map the different types of corruption and to understand the context in which these occur. The risk depends on the capacity of a society to prevent people entrusted with

public office from abusing it in their own interest - the control of corruption. Where this capacity is low, corruption risk is high. Risk indicators measure the context that can enable corruption. Measuring opportunities or risks (circumstances that enable corruption) and constraints (circumstances that deter corruption) are also important for policy makers to identify risks as well as best practices for addressing them. A society with moderate to low constraints may still manage to control corruption if opportunities remain low. The opportunities most discussed in the literature are administrative discretion resulting from lack of transparency and from red tape, on one hand, and the material opportunities, like natural resources, lack of transparency in public expenditure, inflows of cash as aid, on the other hand.

- *Response indicators.* As risk varies across societies (for instance, some countries have resources concentrated in few institutions, which provide higher opportunities for corruption), so does the State response. The response indicators are also indirect measures because they do not measure the occurrence of corruption, but how the State responds to it through legislative initiatives (classified in the framework as *de jure*), and criminal justice actions or other actions that target corruption perpetrators (classified in the framework as *de facto* response). Trends in response indicators measure a mix of trends in the capacity and political will to combat corruption and corruption itself, so they are labelled as indirect rather than direct measures because they don't clearly inform on the level of corruption. The *de jure* category can be further quantified using a benchmark (comprehensiveness of conflict-of-interest regulation, for instance) and the measurement of each country against it. The *de jure* and the *de facto* are separated because the evidence shows that important implementation gaps exist, and the countries with the most comprehensive regulation are not necessarily the least corrupt or the ones that improve the most.

26. Each indicator included in the framework is not to be used in isolation. The matrix format aims at describing each type of corruption in a combination of indicators as alone each indicator may give partial or biased information. For example, a high level of convictions for corruption may mean a high level of corruption or a high level of state response to corruption. Considering this indicator in combination with indicators on the level of bribery experience by citizens gives a complete picture: high bribery levels with low conviction rates suggest a high level of corruption with a low state response while low a level of bribery with a high level of convictions indicates a low incidence of corruption with a high level of state response. The matrix can be used by columns, by row or a combination of both.

- *Columns as analytical categories.* Reading the matrix by column captures the analytic building blocks that describe corruption, the factors that enable it and the capacity to deter it. They provide the space to integrate different types of measurement (direct, indirect), while also monitoring the relevant risks based on enabling and mitigating circumstances for corruption, i.e., the opportunities and constraints, as well as the official legal and law enforcement response. The columns related to Risks and Response describe some specific elements of the preventive anti-corruption policies and practices mentioned in Article 5 of UNCAC.

- *Rows as analytical categories.* Rows in the matrix use the various features of corruption that UNCAC lists, thus allowing different forms of corruption to be accommodated complementarily into the same framework. One feature or manifestation or type of corruption, say, illicit enrichment, is thus monitored by perception, direct measurements and indirect ones, the former including also measures for enabling and mitigating context, for legal response and for *de facto* response. A further implementation gap can be calculated between the *de jure* response and the *de facto* one. This allows for a highly adaptable framework that can also be replicated at the sub-national level or for different sectors. When duly filled in, the matrix will provide, in one glance, a better picture of the prevalence of a specific type of corruption (through measurements), as well as an overview of the disabling and enabling circumstances.
27. The ensemble of the framework indicators, enabling and disabling factors for corruption can be measured at national and sector level, as each sector adds its own specificity and risks. However, the national context remains present in each and every sector, as it is the national level which shapes the legal and policy formulation. Still, differences varying in importance can be found at geographical level (cities may vary substantially from countryside as to the collective action capacity of citizenry) and sector.

VII. The gender dimension in measuring corruption

28. The relationship between corruption and gender has increasingly been explored. Some research, for example, has looked into the impact of women's political participation on the level of corruption and found that countries with higher representation of women in public administration and in the labor market show lower levels of corruption, suggesting that women are in general less likely to tolerate and engage in bribery. Bringing a gender perspective in corruption measurement is therefore important.
29. This Statistical framework mainstreams the gender dimension across all indicators where this is relevant together with other demographic and social characteristics such as age and ethnicity that can help to better understand sub-population groups that may be more vulnerable to corruption and require specific policy responses..

Figure 1. Dimensions of the statistical framework to measure corruption.





Fig 2. Summary of the Statistical Framework to measure corruption.


The figures below display all the indicators contained in the framework organized by element or dimension associated to corruption. The core indicators are those under direct measures. These are the ones that would be useful to assess if the levels of corruption are increasing or decreasing; while the rest of measures are indirect measures that provide additional information about the context in which corruption happens. The indirect measures are divided in measures of perception, risks, and responses. Perceptions from different constituencies, such as general population,

business, and public officials regarding the specific areas of corruption is the starting point in understanding national contexts and helps to identify risk sectors. Risk measures are designed to collect data on the elements that can enable corruption and in those that may act as deterrents. Finally, response measures capture if legislative frameworks to prevent and tackle corruption are in place, as well as the state response after implementing those legal frameworks.


1. Specific corruption areas as criminalized in UNCAC.



2. Preventive measures



3. Enabling environment to report and address corruption



ANNEX 1: Statistical Framework to measure corruption.

I. Components of the statistical framework to measure corruptionⁱⁱ

1. CORRUPTION AREAS AS CRIMINALIZED ⁱⁱⁱ IN UNCAC						
ELEMENTS/ DIMENSIONS	DIRECT MEASURES	INDIRECT MEASURES				
		PERCEPTION	RISK		RESPONSE	
			OPPORTUNITIES (Circumstances that enable corruption)	CONSTRAINTS (Circumstances that may deter corruption)	DE JURE (Regulation)	DE FACTO (Implementation)
<p>1.1 Bribery of national public officials^{iv} and persons working in the private sector (UNCAC Art. 15 and Art. 21)</p>	<p>1.1.a Prevalence of bribery in dealings with public officials^v among the population Proportion of persons who had at least one contact with a public official and who paid a bribe to a public official, or were asked for a bribe by those public officials, during the previous 12 months^{vi} Disaggregated by function of</p>	<p>1.1.d Perception of corruption in the public sector^{vii} Proportion of persons who perceive that the public sector is corrupt^{viii} Disaggregated by age, sex and by government branches (e.g., executive, legislative and judiciary) and also by government level (e.g., national, and local) and</p>		<p>1.1.e E-Government^{ix} coverage Proportion of persons who carried out at least one public procedure and who did so use a digital platform Disaggregated by sex, age and type of procedure.</p> <p>1.1.f Reporting behavior of bribery in dealings with public officials among the population/business. Proportion of people/business who reported</p>	<p>1.1.g Criminalization of bribery Criminalization of bribery or related conduct in the national legislation as per Article 15 of UNCAC</p>	<p>1.1.h.1 Bribery investigation^x Total number of persons under investigation for bribery recorded in a given year divided by the total population in the same year, multiplied by 100,000 disaggregated by sex.</p> <p>1.1.h.2 Bribery prosecution^{xi} Total number of persons prosecuted for bribery recorded in a given year divided by the total population in the same year, multiplied by 100,000 disaggregated by sex</p> <p>1.1.h.3 Bribery conviction^{xii}</p>

	<p>public official, sex of the person and the public official.</p> <p>1.1.b Prevalence of bribery in dealings with public officials among businesses Proportion of businesses who had at least one contact with a public official and who paid a bribe to a public official or were asked for a bribe by those public officials, during the previous 12 months.</p> <p>1.1.c Total monetary value of bribes paid by all people during the previous 12 months.</p>			<p>the case to competent authorities in the last 12 months.</p>		<p>Total number of persons convicted for bribery recorded in a given year divided by the total population in the same year, multiplied by 100,000. disaggregated by sex.</p> <p>1.1.h.4 Assets recovered from bribery Total amount of assets recovered^{xiii} from bribery convictions</p>
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	Disaggregated by public official function					
1.2 Trading in influence^{xiv} (UNCAC art. 18)	1.2.a Use of personal connections to obtain public employment Percentage of successful applicants for public sector positions who used undue advantage ^{xv} , bribery or both to secure public sector jobs	1.2.b Use of personal connection to obtain public employment. Percentage of public officials that perceive that public officials influence the hiring of friends or relatives in the public sector	N/A	1.2.c Conflict of Interest^{xvi} regulation Existence of a control body to monitor and enforce financial and Conflict of Interest disclosures	1.2.d Criminalization of trading in influence Criminalization of trading in influence or related conduct in the national legislation as per Article 18 of UNCAC 1.2.d.1 “Cool-off” regulation Existence of gap periods ^{xvii} for public officials moving to the private sector ^{xviii}	1.2.e.1 Trading in influence investigation Total number of persons under investigation for engaging in trading in influence recorded in a given year divided by the total population in the same year, multiplied by 100,000. disaggregated by sex. 1.2.e.2 Trading in influence prosecution Total number of persons prosecuted for trading in influence recorded in a given year divided by the total population in the same year, multiplied by 100,000 disaggregated by sex 1.2.e.3 Trading in influence conviction Total number of persons convicted for engaging in trading in influence recorded in a given year divided by the total population in the same

						<p>year, multiplied by 100,000 disaggregated by sex.</p> <p>1.2.e.4 Assets recovered from trading in influence Total amount of assets recovered from trading in influence convictions.</p>
<p>1.3 Illicit enrichment^{xix} (UNCAC art. 20)</p>	<p>1.3.an Income declaration Proportion of public officials whose reported income differs from their disclosed assets ^{xx}</p>	<p>1.3.b Use of public office to obtain illicit gain. Percentage of public officials that perceive that public officials use their office to obtain illicit gains or income beyond their alleged salary</p>	N/A	<p>1.3.c Asset/Wealth evolution regulation Existence of a control body to monitor and enforce patrimonial wealth disclosures of public officials.</p> <p>1.3.d Percentage of public officials who disclose their wealth out of the total number of public officials. disaggregated by sex</p>	<p>1.3.e Criminalization of illicit enrichment Criminalization of illicit enrichment or related conduct in the national legislation as per Article 20 of UNCAC</p> <p>1.3.f Financial disclosure regime Existence of regulation on wealth disclosure for public officials</p>	<p>1.3.g.1 Illicit enrichment investigation Total number of persons under investigation for engaging in illicit enrichment recorded in a given year divided by the total population in the same year, multiplied by 100,000disaggregated by sex.</p> <p>1.3.g.2 Illicit enrichment prosecution Total number of persons prosecuted for Illicit enrichment recorded in a given year divided by the total population in the same year, multiplied by 100,000. disaggregated by sex.</p> <p>1.3.g.3 Illicit enrichment conviction</p>

						<p>Total number of public officials convicted for engaging in illicit enrichment divided by the total population in the same year, multiplied by 100,000 disaggregated by sex.</p> <p>1.3.g.4 Assets recovered from illicit enrichment Total amount of assets recovered from illicit enrichment convictions.</p>
<p>1.4 Embezzlement^{xxi}, misappropriation, or diversion^{xxii} of property or public funds (UNCAC art. 17)</p>	N/A	N/A	<p>1.4.a Discretionary allocation Proportion of total government budget that can be allocated outside the formal budget approval process</p>	<p>1.4.b Misused public funds. Monetary value of irregularities ruled by the Supreme Audit Institution as a share of the total audited^{xxiii} public budget</p>	<p>1.4.c Criminalization of embezzlement, misappropriation or diversion of property or public funds Criminalization of embezzlement, misappropriation or diversion of property or public funds or related conduct in the national legislation as per Articles 17 and 22 of UNCAC</p>	<p>1.4.d.1 Embezzlement, misappropriation, or diversion investigation Total number of persons under investigation for engaging in embezzlement, misappropriation, or diversion recorded in a given year divided by the total population in the same year, multiplied by 100,000 disaggregated by sex.</p> <p>1.4.d.2 Embezzlement, misappropriation, or diversion prosecution Total number of persons prosecuted for embezzlement, misappropriation, or diversion recorded in a given year divided by the total population in the</p>

						<p>same year, multiplied by 100,000 by sex.</p> <p>1.4.d.3 Embezzlement, misappropriation, or diversion conviction Rate of persons convicted engaging in embezzlement, misappropriation, or diversion recorded in a given year divided by the total population in the same year, multiplied by 100,000 disaggregated by sex.</p> <p>1.4.d.4 Assets recovered from embezzlement, misappropriation, or diversion Total amount of assets recovered from embezzlement, misappropriation, or diversion convictions</p>
<p>1.5 Abuse of functions^{xxiv} (UNCAC art. 19)</p>	N/A	<p>1.5.a Perception on abuse of functions Total number of officials who reported any event or behavior that could have constituted an act of corruption / Total number of public officials x 100</p>	N/A	N/A	<p>1.5.b Criminalization of abuse of functions Criminalization of abuse of functions or related conduct in the national legislation as per Article 19 of UNCAC</p>	<p>1.5.c.1 Abuse of functions investigation Total number of persons under investigation for abuse of functions recorded in a given year divided by the total population in the same year, multiplied by 100,000. disaggregated by sex</p>

						<p>1.5.c.2 Abuse of functions prosecution Total number of persons prosecuted for abuse of functions recorded in a given year divided by the total population in the same year, multiplied by 100,000disaggregated by sex.</p> <p>1.5.c.3 Abuse of functions conviction Total number of persons convicted for abuse of functions recorded in a given year divided by the total population in the same year, multiplied by 100,000disaggregated by sex.</p> <p>1.5.c.4 Assets recovered from abuse of functions Total amount of assets recovered from abuse of functions convictions</p>
<p>1.6 Obstruction of Justice^{xxv} (UNCAC art. 25)</p>	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	<p>1.6.a Criminalization of obstruction of justice Criminalization of obstruction of justice or related conduct in the national legislation as per Article 20 of UNCAC</p>	<p>1.6.b.1 Obstruction of justice investigation Total number of persons under investigation for engaging in obstruction of justice recorded in a given year divided by the total population in the same year, multiplied by 100,000.</p>

						<p>dissagregated by sex</p> <p>1.6.b.2 Obstruction of justice prosecution Total number of persons prosecuted for obstruction of justice recorded in a given year divided by the total population in the same year, multiplied by 100,000. disaggregated by sex.</p> <p>1.6.b.3 Obstruction of justice sentencing Total number of persons convicted for engaging in obstruction of justice recorded in a given year divided by the total population in the same year, multiplied by 100,000. disaggregated by sex.</p> <p>1.6.b.4 Assets recovered from obstruction of justice Total amount of assets recovered from obstruction of justice convictions.</p>
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2. PREVENTING MEASURES						
ELEMENTS/ DIMENSIONS	DIRECT MEASURES	INDIRECT MEASURES				
		PERCEPTION	RISK		RESPONSE	
			OPPORTUNITIES (Circumstances that enable corruption)	CONSTRAINTS (Circumstances that may deter corruption)	DE JURE (Regulation)	DE FACTO (Implementation)
2.1 Merit-based public hiring (UNCAC Art 7.1a, 7.2)	2.1.an Open recruitment Proportion of public sector employees appointed without an open recruitment process in the past 12 months	N/A	2.1.b Competitive recruitment Proportion of open recruitments for public sector positions with just one candidate	2.1.c Complaint settlements Number of complaints of civil servants against the government settled on grounds of abusive dismissal ^{xxvi}	2.1.d Public service^{xxvii} regime Existence of guidelines for merit-based recruitment in the public sector	2.1.e Irregular hiring processes. Number of public sector appointments reverted due to irregularities in the hiring process per 1,000 recruitments
2.2 Independence and integrity^{xxviii} of the judiciary (UNCAC Art 11:1)	2.2.a Judicial ethics^{xxix} Number of admonishments for magistrates on ethical grounds the past 12 months	2.2.b.1 Perception of corruption in the judiciary Proportion of persons who perceive that the judiciary is corrupt. 2.2.b.2 Perception of	N/A		2.2.c Institutional reporting Existence of annual public report on integrity problems in the judiciary	2.2.d Ethical and integrity-related dismissal Proportion of public officials dismissed on the grounds of ethics and integrity misdemeanors

		corruption in law enforcement agencies Proportion of persons who perceive that law enforcement agencies are corrupt				
2.3 Conflict of interest (UNCAC art. 7)	2.3.a Proportion of public official who made their conflict-of-interest (COI) disclosures	N/A	N/A	2.3.b Control body to monitor and enforce COI disclosures.	2.3.c Existence of COI regulation	2.3.d Share of public officials sanctioned for not filling in COI disclosures the previous year according to national legislation.
2.4 Management of public finances (UNCAC art. 9)		N/A	2.4.a Disclosure and accessibility of budgetary information This indicator captures the extent of budgetary information that is made available to the public, as well as its degree of accessibility. 2.4.b Share of total government budget not subject to public	2.4.c Existence of regulation on the direct patrimonial responsibility of public servants, return of misappropriated funds and resources, and compensation for damages caused by their misuse to the injured parties.	2.4.e Comprehensiveness of budget disclosure requirements. The extent to which national laws, regulations, policies, and guidelines provide a basis for collecting and publishing data on public finances.	2.4.d Sanctions^{xxx} against public officials for financial misconduct^{xxxi}. Number of public officials and civil servants fined, sanctioned, or imprisoned for embezzlement, misappropriation, or diversion of public funds per 1,000,000 population

			disclosure due to confidentiality			
2.5 Public Procurement (UNCAC art. 9)	2.5.a % of public contracts awarded without competition (without another bidder) in numbers and % volume total.	N/A	2.5.b % of public tenders for which information was published (open call/invitation, selection criteria, selection process, award information, appeal process).	2.5.c Percentage of procurement cases/procurement volume that were advertised online	2.5.d Compliance of public procurement regulation as per UNCAC article 9.	2.5.e Ratio of criminal convictions ^{xxxii} related to irregularities in procurement processes.
2.6 Candidature for and election to public office (UNCAC art 7.2 and 7.3)	2.6.a Total campaign spending per candidate vs. total campaign funds allocated per candidate. 2.6.b Total campaign spending per political party vs. total campaign funds allocated per political party.	2.6.d.1 Percentage of citizens who perceived corruption in the processes of election to public office 2.6.d.2 Percentage of citizens who perceive corruption within political parties	2.6.e.1 Lack of an autonomous electoral body 2.6.e.2 Lack of accessibility and availability of political party funding data/information		2.6.f.1 Regulatory measures that sanction acts of corruption in elections 2.6.f.2 Comprehensiveness of political finance legislation: evaluation of existing prohibitions, regulations, and restrictions on financing for political campaigns	2.6.g.1 Percentage of public officials who were sanctioned for failing to disclose required information on campaign public financing 2.6.g.2 Criminal proceedings initiated and terminated in relation to electoral offenses

	2.6.c Percentage of population who experienced vote buying during the past election					
2.7 Public reporting (UNCAC art. 10)					2.7.a Existence of administrative procedures to report illegal or questionable actions of public officials	2.7.b Number of reports of illegal or questionable actions of public officials
2.8 Preventive measures for the private sector and state owned enterprises. (UNCAC art. 12)	2.8.a Internal controls and auditing # of audits performed in processes vulnerable to corruption	2.8.b Perception of corruption in the private sector Proportion of persons who perceive that the private sector is corrupt ^{xxxiii} 2.8.c Perception of corruption in State-owned enterprises Proportion of persons who perceive that	N/A		2.8.d Private sector and State-owned enterprises regulatory normative framework	2.8.e.1 Number of sanctions ^{xxxiv} as a result of auditing process where irregularities where found. 2.8.e.2 Number of dismissals as a result of an auditing process where irregularities where found. 2.8.e.3 Number of reports to law enforcement authorities as a result of an auditing process where irregularities where found.

		State-owned enterprises are corrupt					
2.9 Preventive measures for the private sector and state owned enterprises. (UNCAC art. 12)	N/A	2.9.a Share of employees that perceive a corruption culture in the enterprise/ state owned enterprises	N/A	2.9.b Proportion of medium and large private enterprises with a compliance unit ^{xxxv} 2.9.c Proportion of State-owned enterprises with a compliance unit			
2.10 Training programs (UNCAC art. 7)	2.10.a Proportion of public officials that completed anticorruption training programs				2.10.b Existence of compulsory anticorruption education		
3. ENABLING ENVIRONMENT TO REPORT AND ADDRESS CORRUPTION							
ELEMENTS /DIMENSIONS	DIRECT MEASURES		PERCEPTION	INDIRECT MEASURES			
				RISK		RESPONSE	
				OPPORTUNITIES (Circumstances that enable corruption)	CONSTRAINTS (Circumstances that may deter corruption)	DE JURE (Regulation)	DE FACTO (Implementation)

3.1 International cooperation (UNCAC art.43, 44, 46, 47 & 49)	3.1.a Extradition^{xxxvi} Share of extradition requests fulfilled out of the total number of extradition requests received in the last 12 months	N/A	N/A	N/A		3.1.b Mutual legal assistance^{xxxvii} Share of mutual legal assistance requests fulfilled out of the total number of mutual legal assistance requests received ^{xxxviii} in the last 12 months.
3.2 Resources allocated to fight corruption	3.2.a Percentage of funds in the annual budget allocated and executed to programs to fight corruption reported by the Ministry of Finance or other ministry designated to report public spending	N/A	N/A	N/A	3.2.b.1 Existence of a cross-cutting policy at the different levels of government related to the fight against corruption. 3.2.b.2 Existence of an entity, internal department, or institutional or intersectora	3.2.c Percentage of people assigned to institutions dedicated to fight corruption reported by the National relevant institution

					I level focused on the fight against corruption.	
3.3 Transparency^{xxxix} (UNCAC art. 7,9 and 10)	3.3.a.1 Number of verified cases of killings of journalists	N/A	N/A	3.3.b Availability of comprehensive information online on -procurement (Number of awarded tenders with the most economically advantageous offers, number of unopened tenders; Number of tenders with single solicitation (only one offer allowed against only one offer submitted)	3.3.c. Comprehensive freedom of information (FOI) regulation, full scale, and benchmarks.	
3.4 Protection of reporting persons (UNCAC art. 33)	3.4.a Whistleblowing^{xl} reporting Proportion of corruption-related investigations opened due to whistleblowing mechanisms. Disaggregated by sex of the reporting person, sex of the alleged perpetrator and type of crime/conduct	3.4.b Whistleblowing perception Proportion of population that has a negative opinion of whistleblowing reporting 3.4.c Proportion of public officials that perceive that	N/A	N/A	3.4.d Mechanisms for protecting witnesses and experts Number of mechanisms against potential retaliation or intimidation for witnesses and experts who give testimony concerning	

		they experienced retaliation after reporting			corruption- related offences	
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End notes

ⁱ Indicator 16.5.1 Proportion of persons who had at least one contact with a public official and who paid a bribe to a public official, or were asked for a bribe by those public officials, during the previous 12 months and indicator 16.5.2 Proportion of businesses that had at least one contact with a public official and that paid a bribe to a public official, or were asked for a bribe by those public officials during the previous 12 months. See Global SDG Indicator Framework adopted by the General Assembly in A/RES/71/313 available at: [SDG Indicators — SDG Indicators \(un.org\)](#)

ⁱⁱ All definitions presented in the framework are for statistical purposes, they are not legal definitions.

ⁱⁱⁱ Criminalization: Is an act or determination of a ruler about certain acts which by the society or members of the society considered as acts which can be penalized as a criminal act or making an act to become a criminal act and therefore can be penalized by the government by and on behalf of the government.

^{iv} Bribery: the promise, offering or giving to a public official, directly or indirectly, of an undue advantage, for the official himself or herself or another person or entity, in order that the official act or refrain from acting in the exercise of his or her official duties. Or the solicitation or acceptance by a public official, directly or indirectly, of an undue advantage, for the official himself or herself or another person or entity, in order that the official act or refrain from acting in the exercise of his or her official duties. It can include public or foreign public officials.

^v Public official: (i) any person holding a legislative, executive, administrative or judicial office of a State Party, whether appointed or elected, whether permanent or temporary, whether paid or unpaid, irrespective of that person's seniority; (ii) any other person who performs a public function, including for a public agency or public enterprise, or provides a public service, as defined in the domestic law of the State Party and as applied in the pertinent area of law of that State Party; (iii) any other person defined as a "public official" in the domestic law of a State Party

^{vi} International standards to use population and business surveys to measure the experience of bribery by public officials can be found at: [Microsoft Word - CorruptionManual 2018-10-10 final printing-Clean for printshop_final_18oct2018 \(unodc.org\)](#).

^{vii} Public Sector: Set of administrative bodies through which the State fulfills or enforces the policy and will expressed in the fundamental laws of the country. It includes all administrative bodies of the federal legislative, executive, and judicial branches and autonomous public agencies. It therefore includes the Central Sector and the Parastatal Sector, and all local levels

^{viii} This indicator is a better measure than the perception recorded among public officials because it overcomes the reporting bias of those who may be corrupted themselves or those who fear retaliation if they report corruption. International standards to use population and business surveys to measure the perception of bribery can be found at: [Microsoft Word - CorruptionManual 2018-10-10 final printing-Clean for printshop_final_18oct2018 \(unodc.org\)](#).

^{ix} E-government: It can be defined as the use of ICT by government agencies for the purpose of increasing and improving accessibility, effectiveness, and accountability. The principal goals of e-government should be efficient and improved service to customers, increased transparency, empowerment through access to information, efficient government purchasing and efficient administration

^x Investigation: investigation is understood as the gathering of evidence about the detected case of corruption, including information about its extent, nature, effects, and the parties involved, to decide whether and which measures need to be taken. Investigations may be carried out internally within the organization concerned or through law enforcement agencies or other external actors, such as anti-corruption agencies, the police, or prosecutors

^{xi} Prosecution: to bring legal action against for redress or punishment of a crime or violation of law

^{xii} Sentencing: The punishment the competent authority decides should be given to someone who has been convicted of a crime

^{xiii} Asset recovery: the return of illicitly obtained goods and assets for the purpose of redressing the impact of corruption. For further reference on asset recovery, see the United Nations Convention against Corruption Chapter V

^{xiv} Trading in influence: The promise, offering or giving to a public official or any other person, directly or indirectly, of an undue advantage in order that the public official or the person abuse his or her real or supposed influence with a view to obtaining from an administration or public authority of the State Party an undue advantage for the original instigator of the act or for any other person. The solicitation or acceptance by a public official or any other person, directly or indirectly, of an undue advantage for himself or herself or for another person in order that the public official or the person abuse his or her real or supposed influence with a view to obtaining from an administration or public authority of the State Party an undue advantage

^{xv} Undue advantage: this is a form of favoritism based on friends, family and familiar acquaintances and relationships whereby someone in an official position exploits his or her power and authority to provide a job or a special favor to a family member or friend, even though he or she may not be qualified or deserving

^{xvi} Conflict of interest: a conflict between the public duty and private interests of a public official, in which the public official has private-capacity interests that could improperly influence the performance of their official duties and responsibilities

^{xvii} Gap period: A limitation for hiring of a person who has been a public servant during a certain amount of time, who possesses privileged information directly acquired by reason of his employment, position or commission in the public service and allows the contracting party to benefit in the market or place himself/herself in an advantageous situation compared to his competitors

^{xviii} Private Sector: It is composed of companies, households and institutions that are not controlled by the public sector and are operated for the benefit of private individuals

^{xix} Statistical measure of Illicit enrichment: The significant increase in the assets of a public official with respect to his or her legitimate income that cannot be reasonably justified, nor is of legitimate origin

^{xx} This can be applied only in jurisdictions where there is a system for public officials to declare their income.

^{xxi} Embezzlement: Misappropriation or other diversion by a public official for his or her benefit or for the benefit of another person or entity, of any property, public or private funds or securities or any other thing of value entrusted to the public official by virtue of his or her position

^{xxii} Diversion of public resources: The authorization, request, or performance of acts for the allocation or diversion of public resources, whether material, human or financial, without legal basis or contrary to the applicable rules

^{xxiii} Audit: A formal investigation of the accounts or financial situation of an organization or individual and a methodical examination and review. Audits can be internal, meaning they are performed by the organization itself; or external, meaning they are performed by an independent outside entity

^{xxiv} Abuse of functions: the performance of or failure to perform an act, in violation of laws, by a public official in the discharge of his or her functions, for the purpose of obtaining an undue advantage for himself or herself or for another person or entity

^{xxv} Obstruction of justice: the use of physical force, threats or intimidation, or the promise, offering or giving of an undue advantage to induce false testimony or to interfere in the giving of testimony or the production of evidence in a proceeding in relation to the commission of offences established in accordance with the United Nations Convention against Corruption

^{xxvi} Abusive dismissal: UNCAC Article 19 reads that Each State Party shall consider adopting such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to establish as a criminal offence, when committed intentionally, the abuse of functions or position, that is, the performance of or failure to perform an act, in violation of laws, by a public official in the discharge of his or her functions, for the purpose of obtaining an undue advantage for himself or herself or for another person or entity. Abuse dismissal refers to the discharge of functions of a public official for the purpose of obtaining undue advantage.

^{xxvii} Public service: Comprises persons employed by public authorities at central, regional, and local levels and include both civil servants and public employees

^{xxviii} Integrity: behaviors and actions consistent with a series of moral or ethical standards and principles, adopted by individuals as well as institutions, which operate as a barrier against corruption and in favor of the Rule of Law. Strict adherence to a moral code, reflected in honesty, transparency, and complete harmony in what one thinks, says and does

^{xxix} Ethics: the attempt to understand the nature of human values, of how we ought to live and of what constitutes the right conduct

^{xxx} Sanction: UNCAC Article 30 para. 1 provides that “each State Party shall make the commission of [corruption] offences [...] liable to sanctions that take into account the gravity of that offence.” Moreover,

The OSCE Handbook on Combating Corruption issues the following recommendation regarding sanctions: “The level of sentencing must take into account the gravity of the offence and be ‘effective, proportionate and dissuasive’; the sanctions must address the natural and legal person and the range of sentencing options should include imprisonment, monetary and non-monetary penalties, confiscation, suspension, removal or disqualification from public office and debarment as well as disciplinary measures.”

^{xxxvi} Misconduct: Contravention of the provisions of the law, which might be classified at least as: serious, non-serious

^{xxxvii} Conviction: Adjudication of a criminal defendant's guilt

^{xxxviii} Current survey tools measure perception of bribery in the private sector

^{xxxix} Sanctions are intended to be effective, proportionate and dissuasive. These aim to improve performance and are financial and non-financial. Non-financial sanction may encompass private notices requiring abstaining from repetition of the observed conduct; a public notice for the same effect; order to take action; temporary ban to perform its functions; permanent ban from functions.

^{xl} Compliance: Procedures, systems or departments within public agencies or companies that ensure that all legal, operational, and financial activities comply with applicable laws, rules, norms, regulations, and standards

^{xli} Extradition: The formal process whereby a State requests from the requested State the return of a person accused or convicted of a crime to stand trial or serve a sentence in the requesting State

^{xlii} Mutual legal assistance (MLA): in criminal matters is a process by which States seek for and provide assistance to other States in servicing of judicial document and gathering evidence for use in criminal cases

^{xliii} The granting of mutual legal assistance depends on a series of factors, such as the criminalization of the offence in the receiving State, or that the person subject of the request has not been yet convicted or acquitted for the same offence.

^{xliiii} Transparency: an environment of openness where the access and disclosure of information is a matter of principle and human rights. Leaders, officials, and those in power operate in a visible and predictable manner that promotes trust and participation. Transparency is widely understood as a necessary precondition to prevent corruption and promote good governance and sustainability

^{xliiii} Whistleblower: Person who reports in good faith and on reasonable grounds to the competent authorities any facts concerning offences established in accordance with the UNCAC

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